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ABSTRACT 
 Despite increasing interest in managerial reputation, little research in the management 
field has attempted to theorize and empirically examine reputation as a dynamic construct.  This 
paper synthesizes prior reputation literature across disciplines to develop a model of reputation 
change.  Using the context of executive termination it is hypothesized that the same managerial 
outcome (i.e. termination) carries varied meaning to stakeholders depending on the actions 
leading to and reason for termination and such meaning impacts the level of executive reputation 
decline and repair.  Additionally, drawing on four established theoretical mechanisms in the 
reputation literature it is hypothesized that various traits, relationships, performance signals, and 
repudiation activities also influence the reputation repair of executives.  Using survival analysis 
and a sample of 487 CEO terminations, results suggest the strongest influence on reputation 
repair to be executive traits and relational ties.      
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Early reputation work diverged in views of reputation, including reputation as a signal in 
transactions (economics), a personal asset (strategy), an information-processing mechanism 
(marketing), a sense-making tool (OT), an intangible asset (accounting), and a means of social 
information exchange (sociology) (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997).  Despite these different views, 
virtually all reputation definitions include elements of stakeholder or public impressions and 
evaluation.  For example, these definitions include the beliefs of various stakeholders regarding 
the likelihood of delivering value (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999), the “accumulation of high levels 
of public recognition of quality” (Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova (2010, 1132), and the aggregate 
perceptions of past actions (Walker, 2010).  Since individuals construct their attitudes based on 
their information about an object (Wilson & Hodges, 1992) and attitudes are not stable, changes 
in the type or amount of information influence reputation evaluations (Brooks, Highhouse, 
Russell, & Mohr, 2003).  Therefore, based on the definition of reputation as an overall attitude 
held by others, reputations can and do change. 
 Reputation continues to gain popularity in management literature (Lange, Lee, & Dai, 
2011), though it is typically treated as rather static.  This treatment of reputation is surprising 
given the number of studies investigating the building or enhancement of reputation, which by 
their very nature are changes in reputation.  Others have called attention to reputation change 
both subtlety and explicitly.  In a recent review Lange and colleagues (2011: 154) described 
reputation as “rooted in historical behavior and associations but can be abruptly changed if new 
information about past behavior comes to light or if the latest behaviors or associations are 
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jarring to observers.”  Bromley (2000: 240) described reputation as a “skewed distribution of 
beliefs” in a social network that changes over time.  In addition, two studies explicitly examine 
reputation change.  Love and Kraatz (2009), study the specific mechanisms underlying firm 
reputation decline, while Rhee & Valdez (2009) propose the factors influencing a firm’s 
capability to repair its reputation.  Yet despite the implied changes in reputation based on its very 
definition and the recent studies demonstrating reputation change occurs, the literature is nearly 
void of studies examining the processes and outcomes of reputation change.       
Management scholars continue to focus on the positive aspects of reputation (Mishina, 
Mannor, & Block, 2008) while largely ignoring the negative (Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014).  
Positive reputation is conferred upon individuals who win awards (Wade, Porac, Pollock, & 
Graffin, 2006), obtain media attention and praise (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004), and 
consistently signal quality (Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010).  Reputation, however, ranges 
from highly favorable to highly unfavorable (Brooks et al, 2003; Deephouse & Carter, 2005).  
Thus, far less is known about what influences the bad reputation to be conferred on individuals, 
or, along similar lines, what influences decline in one’s reputation.  
This inquiry is important given that while negative action harms reputation, the 
distribution of social consequences, such as reputation decline, is not uniform (Matsueda, 2013) 
even for the same offense.  Consider the example of the Exxon Valdez and Pembina Pipelines oil 
spills, both one of the largest spills for the countries in which they occurred.  More than a decade 
after the Exxon spill the organization continued to suffer from a bad reputation (based on the 
Reputation Institute’s RQ index) while Pembina enjoyed positive media attention as well as an 
increase in stock price during the aftermath of the spill (Willcocks, 2001).  Prior work suggests 
such an asymmetry of outcomes is influenced by personal characteristics (Paternoster & Iovanni, 
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1989).  Other proposed reasons include the generalization of prior judgments (Kroska & 
Harkness, 2006) to the present action, where positive information buffers negative information.  
Additionally, several experiments conducted by Brooks and colleagues (2003) provide evidence 
that different information carries different weight in reputational evaluations.  Therefore, 
focusing on executives released from employment, this study develops a theory of how 
reputational decline occurs and its subsequent outcomes.  It is proposed that executive 
characteristics, the attention paid to the termination event, and the setting of the termination 
event influence the severity of reputation decline. 
 The processes and factors influencing executive reputation repair, as opposed to decline, 
represent a substantial absence in the current literature.  While studies of building reputation 
abound (Lange, et al, 2011), such studies assume a starting point for reputation that primarily 
includes positive behaviors while virtually ignoring negative behaviors.  Essentially, these 
studies do not take into account the impact of reputation damaging events.  Therefore, what 
influences the repair of individuals’ damaged reputations?  This second research question of 
interest seeks to fill the present gap in the literature.   
 Since the literature remains considerably silent on reputation repair, many of the 
hypotheses presented in this study are exploratory in nature.  With the context of this study on 
CEO terminations, drawing on the extant reputation literature provides a foundation with which 
to derive the first set of reputation change hypotheses.  The remaining hypotheses are derived 
from four established theoretical mechanisms in the organizational reputation literature and 
modified to reflect the individual nature of CEO reputation.  First, drawing on status 
characterizes theory reputation operates as a function specific executive traits, including gender, 
nationality, and attractiveness.  Second, drawing on social comparison and status diffusion 
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reputation operates as a function of relationships with others including the power of various 
individuals.  Third, drawing on signaling theory reputation operates as a function of performance 
and quality including performance signals from the media or other firms.  Finally, drawing on 
prior work on norm conformity reputation operates as a function of conforming or deviating 
from social norms including participating in charitable work or leadership.  Using these 
mechanisms one of the primary purposes of this study is to determine which theoretical 
mechanisms actually underlie reputation change thus identify the most influential factors.   
By answering the aforementioned research questions, this study contributes to the 
management literature in multiple ways.  First, this study seeks to further the idea that 
managerial reputation changes in response to new information and such changes have 
consequences for managers.  Despite reputation’s conceptual definition and its identified 
dimensions, this area remains largely understudied.  Second, this study is believed to be the first 
to investigate managerial reputation repair in response to the reputation-damaging event of 
termination from employment.  This study extends extant work on organizational reputation and 
change to identify the most appropriate theoretical roots of managerial reputation change.   After 
identifying such this study determines the specific factors in line with each mechanism believed 
to influence reputation change for managers.  Third, this study examines competing theoretical 
arguments for reputation change simultaneously.  Empirical work on reputation change remains 
underrepresented in the literature despite the multiple theoretical frameworks proposed to 
explain reputation change for organizations  (e.g. Love & Kraatz, 2006; Rhee & Valdez, 2009).  
However, little is known as to which theoretical lenses best explain the phenomena.  This study 
attempts to provide new empirical support of current theoretical explanations.    
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This study is organized as follows.  First, the reputation literature is reviewed, 
highlighting the multiple perspectives of reputation and theoretical lenses used to examine this 
multidimensional construct.  The second section introduces the hypotheses concerning reputation 
damage and reputation repair using the four theoretical lenses identified by Love and Kraatz 
(2009).  Next, the methodology to test the specific research questions is reviewed.  Finally, the 
results are presented with a discussion of the study results, limitations, and future research 
implications.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Early reputation research 
Scholars and philosophers have proclaimed the importance and value of reputation for 
centuries.  Modern business literature started taking a deeper look at reputation in the 1970s, 
focusing on firm reputation as an asset (e.g. Likert & Pyle, 1971).  Klein (1974, 422) states 
“‘reputation’ reflects the confidence consumers have that the actual quality of the product, when 
consumed, will equal the quality that is anticipated, and therefore paid for, when the product is 
purchased.”  From this perspective, reputation included both risks (Anderson, Giese, & Booker, 
1970) and afforded substantial benefits.  For example, in an examination of the ready-to-eat 
cereal industry, Schmalensee (1978) proposed reputation decreased the advertising and 
promotional activity of firms that elected to copy the products of reputionally inferior firms.  
Identifying another benefit, Tolley and Wilman (1977) determined that reputation influenced 
firms’ labor costs. 
Not all scholars viewed reputation in the same manner, however.  Other streams of 
research identified reputation as a motivator of behavior.  For example, reputation was identified 
as a motivator for consulting firms to identify with prestigious client firms (Miner, 1971; Gore, 
1972).  In another study Hunt and Rubin (1973) found national publicity of government-industry 
contracts influenced corporate reputation.  Additionally these authors concluded that in the 
presence of reputation benefits, top management team members were more likely to direct 
additional attention to the contract project as well as engage in efforts to maintain better 
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government-industry relations.  Studies, however, did not adhere to a consistent definition of 
reputation or necessarily include reputation as a focal element. 
In the 1980s reputation took a more central role in studies along with increased attention 
to the social processes surrounding it.  Research also focused more on the reputation of 
individuals as opposed to firms.  Lee and Ofshe (1981) used a mock jury deliberation to 
investigate whether an individual’s reputation or demeanor was a stronger social influence.  
While participant demeanor influenced greater change in jury awards, reputation upwardly 
distorted participant performance ratings.  Thus participants with higher reputations were 
considered better jurors even though they did not successfully influence their peers.  Other 
authors proposed that given limited information-processing capacity individuals must rely on 
shortcuts in attaching meaning to others’ behaviors (Feldman, 1981; Lord, 1985) and such 
shortcuts include reputation.  
Further study of reputation included the role of attributions in forming reputation.  
Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch (1980a) proposed the social meanings attached to individuals’ 
characteristics influence perceived ability and performance expectations.  These expectations 
then inform attributions of prestige and power (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, 
Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Rozenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980b).  For example, based on the 
visibility of their positions, CEOs are observed by the public.  These observations rely on 
executives’ visible characteristics to inform expectations.   
Expansion of reputation research 
Increased attention was paid to reputation in the 1990s.  Multiple disciplines examined 
reputation from both macro and micro perspectives.  Reputation was viewed as an asset, signal, 
information processing mechanism, and sense-making tool (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997).  As an 
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asset reputation was found to positively impact profits (Chu & Chu, 1994) and overall financial 
performance (Preston & O’Bannon, 1997) while providing protection from competitors (Clark & 
Montgomery, 1998).  Studies viewing reputation as a signal found positive influence on 
credibility (Ganesan, 1994) and increased attraction for joint venture partners (Dollinger, 
Golden, & Saxton, 1997) and potential employees (Gatewood, Gowan, & Lautenschlager, 1993; 
Turban & Greening, 1997).  Additionally, reputation aided in maintaining positive relationships 
with distributors (Anderson & Weitz, 1992) and acted as a substitute for monitoring (Diamond, 
1991).  As an information-processing tool reputation was found to influence customers’ product 
selection (Choi & Kim, 1996) along with the actions of auditors and the overall quality of audits 
(Deis & Giroux, 1992).   
Growing reputation conceptualizations and operationalizations prompted critique in the 
literature (e.g. Brown & Perry, 1994).  Reputation’s value to both managers and firms prompted 
examination of its causes and consequences.  For example, Hirshleifer (1993) examined 
investment decisions of managers to determine the role reputation played in decision-making.  
He found managers engage in three specific types of action to maintain their reputations: (1) 
attempting to make short-term successes appear more successful, (2) attempting to release good 
news faster and delay bad news, and (3) attempt to mimic the actions of highly successful 
managers while avoiding similar actions of unsuccessful managers.    
At the turn of the twenty-first century the central definition of reputation was beliefs 
about the likelihood a firm would deliver value among performance dimensions (Rindova & 
Fombrn, 1999).  Thus attention to the impact of reputation, whether executive or corporate, on 
firm performance saw a substantial increase.  For example, Deephouse (2000) investigated the 
value media favorableness, a proxy for firm reputation, as a resource and found the reputation of 
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commercial banks was positively related to return on assets.  From this perspective the reputation 
literature began to answer questions related the leverage of reputation as an asset or resource to 
improve strategic position (e.g. Mahon & Wartick, 2003).  Studies found reputation increased 
investor awareness, customer satisfaction, firm equity and pricing strategies, while allowing 
firms better access to key suppliers, bargaining power, and a protective buffer in the face of 
negative information (Banks, Hutchinson, & Meyer, 2002; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Dowling, 
2002; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). 
Multiple studies of reputation’s antecedents created convergence on its proposed 
formation.  Staw and Epstein (2000) found firm performance and size influence reputation 
formation.  Highhouse, Brooks, and Gregarus (2009) took a more micro perspective on the 
formation of reputation and proposed the cues of specific attributes, such as investments in 
product development, diversification, corporate social responsibility policies, and advertising, as 
well as external factors like the media and customer feedback create impressions in the minds of 
stakeholders.  Reputation is thus a “collective of individual impressions” (Highhouse, et al, 
2009).  Over time, reputational impressions generalize across audiences (Highhouse, Broadfood, 
Yugo, & Devendorf, 2009).     
Interest in the formation of extraordinarily high levels of reputation prompted the 
introduction of celebrity as a construct in the reputation literature.  Hayward and colleagues 
(2004) combine the attributions made by journalists with the attention-garnering actions of 
executives in their celebrity formation propositions.  These authors further propose that such 
high levels of reputation influence executive decision-making by prompting repeated action of 
that which first gave rise to the celebrity, regardless of the potential for negative consequences.  
Other authors propose authenticity and credibility influence the formation of celebrity 
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(Treadway, Adams, Ranft, & Ferris, 2009).  Still others propose seeking celebrity is a decision 
that prompts specific action instead of an incidental consequence of good performance 
(Parmentier, Fischer, & Reuber, 2008, 2013).  Celebrity’s strong ties with performance 
(Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006) indicate it is ultimately a signal of ability (Milbourn, 
2003).  Celebrity consequences include higher executive compensation (Wade, et al., 2006), 
changes in human resources communication (Ranft, Ferris, Perryman, 2007), firm performance 
(Treadway, et al, 2009). 
Many of the reputation studies during this period focused on the positive characteristics 
and actions leading to reputation as well as the positive outcomes afforded to those with high 
reputations.  However, a few exceptions to this draw interesting conclusions.  In their study of 
the most visible American corporations, Gardberg and Fombrun (2002) found that firms 
nominated for the best reputation were typically also nominated for the worst reputation.  
Microsoft’s nominations, for example, were 65 percent best reputation nominations while 35 
percent were for worst reputation.  Interestingly, only thirty companies comprised approximately 
90 percent of the 10,000 nominations for best and worst US corporate reputations.  Building on 
Fombrun and Shanley’s (1990) conclusion that strong media exposure was actually negatively 
related to reputation, Brooks and colleagues (2003) found individuals hold more positive and 
negative evaluations when the target reputation object is more familiar to them.  These authors 
conclude that since individuals “construct attitudes from [a] large database of beliefs about the 
attitude object” (Wilson & Hodges, 1992, 911), multiple reputations are held simultaneously, 
such as financial, customer service, or social responsibility reputation. 
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Current reputation landscape 
The aforementioned studies highlighted the need for additional work in to defining 
reputation and distinguishing it from other constructs like status, legitimacy, and other forms of 
social approval.  Pfarrer and colleagues (2010, 1132) delineate reputation and celebrity by 
defining the former as the “accumulation of high levels of public recognition of quality” and the 
latter as “high level of public attention” with “positive responses from stakeholder audiences”.  
Here reputation is viewed as a signal of quality and celebrity an affective response brought about 
by the media’s portrayal.  Hypothesizing that reputation acts as a stronger buffer than celebrity 
due to greater stability, these authors find that reputation and celebrity have differential impacts.  
First, high reputation had a negative relationship with positive earnings surprises while celebrity 
had a positive relationship.  Additionally, celebrity firms experienced more positive investor 
reactions to earnings surprises than high reputation firms.   
In another study, Stern, et al., (2014) investigate the differences in outcomes for 
reputation and status.  These authors draw on Fombrun’s (1996, 72) definition of reputation as “a 
perceptual representation of a company’ s past actions and future prospects that describes the 
firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals.”  Status, 
on the other hand, was based on Washington and Zajac’s (2005, 284) definition of a “socially 
constructed, intersubjectively agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking of individuals, 
groups, organizations, or activities in a social system.”  These authors find while lower 
reputation and lower status decrease the likelihood of alliance formation, the interaction of high 
reputation and high status amplifies the likelihood of alliance formation. 
Another important aspect to the difference between reputation and related constructs 
concerns measurement.  For example, some studies use press citations for reputation (e.g. 
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Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal, Shevlin, & Zamora, 2006) while others use the same for celebrity 
(e.g. Koh, 2011; Pfarrer, et al, 2010).  These and other inconsistencies over the past decade 
prompted a comprehensive review of the reputation literature (Lange, et al., 2011).  The most 
important conclusion was the multidimensionality of reputation, though rare explicitly 
mentioned in prior literature (Lange, et al, 2011).  Reputation includes three dimensions:  being 
known, being known for something, and generalized favorability.  First, being known refers to 
the extent of awareness or knowledge.  Second, being known for something refers to the level of 
confidence held about future behavior.  Finally, generalized favorability refers to the consistency 
in positive or negative judgments or impressions held.  The identification of reputation’s 
dimensions provides a structured way of grouping studies together during this time period in 
order to examine the convergence and divergence in perspectives.   
Most reputation studies do not focus solely on the being known dimension (Lange, et al, 
2011), primarily due to the typical perspectives that reputation is either an asset or signal, both 
concerned with known for something specific.  A reputation definition used in studies of being 
known stems originates from Bromley’s (2000) delineation of identity, image, and reputation.  
Here reputation is simply the conceptualization of external stakeholder groups.  Another 
conceptualization of reputation as being known is an opinion of external constituents about a 
group of individuals, such as a team (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994).  A third example includes 
reputation simply defined as the collective perceptions of individuals about a reputation object 
(Davies, Chun, da Silva, & Roper, 2001).  Using such definitions, Shamise (2003) uses industry 
dominance (e.g. market share) to examine the formation of reputation, finding specific industry 
characteristics influence the level of being known.  Such characteristics include purchase 
frequency, thus indicating firms producing products purchased more often are associated with 
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high reputation.  Shamise (2003) also found firms with lower priced products had higher 
reputations.  
A large number of reputation studies are concerned with the second dimension of being 
known for something (Lange, et al, 2011).  To be known for something implies specific and 
noticeable action.  Kotler and Levy (1969) introduced the notion that people, just like products, 
can be marketed to wide audiences, coining the term “personal marketing”.  Drawing on this 
Parmentier and colleagues (2013) determine that fashion models need to develop upward 
affiliations in order to become known for something.   
The element of quality underscores this dimension, and multiple definitions include 
reference to quality.  First, Bergh, Ketchen, Boyd, and Bergh (2010, 629) describe reputation as 
“product quality differences” between firms.  Second, Rindova and Fombrun (1999) define 
reputation as the stakeholders’ beliefs about the possibility of delivering value.  Third, others 
view this dimension of reputation as those with desirable quality traits, such as dependability and 
reliability (e.g. Davies, 2002; Dowling, 2002).  With a focus on quality, many studies examining 
this dimension of reputation typically draw on signaling theory (Ferris, et al., 2014), viewing 
reputation as a quality signal. 
In signaling theory the difference of information between parties is very important when 
quality is concerned (Stiglitiz, 2000). Signals typically attempt to communicate positive 
information to highlight desirable attributes (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011).  When 
viewed as a signal, reputation provides information to stakeholders and the general population to 
reduce their information gaps.     
 Examining the impact of academics’ quality research signals, Zamudio, Wang, and 
Haruvy (2013) found the research accomplishments of academics at top universities were viewed 
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more favorably than equivalent research accomplishments at average universities.  Thus 
reputation created an accumulated advantage (e.g. Matthew effect).  In an investigation of 
celebrity CEOs, those known for winning awards, Koh (2011) found reputation was associated 
with more conservative accounting practices, less opportunistic earnings management, and 
stronger firm performance.  Finally, Sinha, Inkson, & Barker (2012), found that being known for 
something signaled justification for the escalation of commitment to failing firm strategy.         
The final dimension of reputation is based on generalized, global perceptions and not 
simply individual attributes of the reputation object or individual stakeholder perceptions.  
Reputation must therefore include all relevant stakeholder impressions (Davies, et al, 2001) to be 
studied from this perspective.  At the same time reputation is not viewed in the light of specific, 
identifiable actions, such as winning awards or responding well to a crisis. The attributions of 
specific stakeholder groups influence reputation (Treadway, et al, 2009) in the presence of 
consistent action over time (Hayward, et al, 2006).  For example, Kjaergaard, Morsing, & Ravasi 
(2011) investigate the long-term influence of media coverage on high reputation firms.  
Employing content analysis of press articles as well as analysis of radio and TV coverage, these 
authors focus on general evaluations and perceptions of the media as stakeholders.  Other studies 
reveal that firms with higher reputations receive more applications (Turban & Cable, 2003) and 
have the opportunity to select better applicants (Close, Moulard, & Monroe, 2011).  
Reputation studies historically focused on one reputation dimension (Lange, et al, 2011), 
however, no evidence currently supports one dimension as more powerful, more valuable, or 
more important than another.  At the same time, reputation studies continue to examine 
reputation as a static construct, despite the inherent changes it undergoes based on its 
conceptualization.  The next section will review the literature on reputation change, including 
 15
decline and repair.  This section will examine the view of reputation, the appropriate dimensions, 
the reputational audience (e.g. individual, firm, stakeholders), and measurement.  By structuring 
the next section in this way, the appropriate gaps in the literature are more easily identified, thus 
introducing in more detail the specific contributions of this paper.   
Reputation change 
 Despite the fact reputations inherently change and shift over time, almost all reputation 
studies examine its consequences from a static perspective.  Reputation research has only 
recently highlighted the importance of reputation change over time.  Changes in reputation occur 
for many reasons.  Kraatz and Love (2006) provide a framework of theoretical perspectives on 
organization reputation change influences.  First, when reputation is viewed as a function of 
specific character traits, then reputation change occurs when actions are inconsistent with 
stakeholders’ view of identity.  Second, when reputation is viewed as a function of symbolic 
conformity and cultural prominence, reputation changes when symbolically appropriate practices 
are either deviated from or adopted.  Third, when reputation is viewed as a function of technical 
efficacy, reputation change occurs when actions are taken which either increase or decrease 
performance or quality.  Finally, when reputation is viewed as a function of relational status, 
reputation change occurs when actions are undertaken that enhance or disconnect one’s personal 
network.  Such a framework points to the importance of clearly identify the appropriate 
theoretical perspective and view of reputation.   The remainder of this section uses this 
framework to review the current literature on reputation change. 
 Character traits (opportunism or identity-inconsistent).  Fischer and Reuber (2007) 
propose that new firms face challenges to reputation formation.  This study views reputation as a 
function of attitudes held by general stakeholders, and it is not the actual signals sent by firms 
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that influence reputation or its change, it is the beliefs of stakeholders about the firms’ cues that 
truly impacts reputation.  These authors propose that new firms build their reputations by being 
perceived to have the characteristics associated with other firms in a specific category.  The 
degree of discrepancy between the firms’ signals and that of other firms, the credibility of the 
firms’ signals, and the motivation by stakeholders to actually process firms’ signals together 
positively influence the formation of positive reputation for new firms.  
 Symbolic conformity (doing what supposed to do because it is deemed “good”).  Bae and 
Cameron (2006) investigated the impact of reputation and corporate giving and found the 
public’s perceived motive for the gift was impacted by firm reputation.  Specifically, firms with 
strong reputations were perceived as giving altruistically, while firms with poor reputations were 
viewed as giving for self-interested reasons.  Thus despite being viewed as a symbolically 
conforming action, corporate social giving alters attitudes about firms differently depending on 
prior reputation. 
 Technical efficacy (impacts performance or quality).  Suurmond, Swank, and Visser 
(2004) present evidence that individuals with poor reputations engage in actions that mimic those 
with good reputation, and it is the engagement in mimicking activities of those with good 
reputations that improves the performance of those with bad reputations.  This allows those with 
poor reputations to improve their reputation while at the same time creating additional work for 
those with high reputations in order to eliminate the possibility of reputational decline.    
 Relational status (impacts who will work with you).  Arend (2000) investigated the 
reputation and its importance to alliance activity and found investing in reputation when other 
similar firms have low reputations lead to an increase in alliance activity.  However, attempting 
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to positively impact reputation when others’ reputations were on average at a good level proved 
more difficult and resulted in decreased alliance activity.   
 One exception in the area of reputation change is Rhee and Valdez’s (2009) theoretical 
examination of reputation repair, incorporating multiple theoretical perspectives to propose the 
critical factors for reputation repair in the event of a damaging event.  Rhee and Valdez (2009) 
proposed that reputation not only influences stakeholder perceptions but also stakeholder 
behavior.  They further posit that reputation repair is not equivalent to reputation building due to 
the impact of the damaging event.  These authors conclude firm age, specialization, and 
networks influence firms’ ability to repair damaged reputations.   
These authors determine that, first, firm age, as an organizational characteristic related to 
reputation change, places a larger burden to do what stakeholders expect or want given a longer 
history of behavior.  Firms that fail act outside their perceived identity would thus have a more 
difficult time repairing damaged reputations.  Second, specialization, not operating in too many 
markets, takes the reputational change perspective of technical efficacy since firms that only 
operate in few industries are perceived to have specialized skills.  Therefore when stakeholders 
perceive such specialized skills put into practice, steps taken to positively impact firm 
performance influence reputation repair.  Finally, networks and other third parties take the 
perspective of relational status in reputation repair.  Specifically, when firms maintain positive 
relations with the media, watchdog agencies, or other groups, stakeholders rely on the 
information that ties remain intact and thus hold more positive perceptions of the firm, 
influencing reputation repair.
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Reputation Decline and Termination 
 Executives that are released from employment face multiple social and professional 
consequences.  Broadly speaking, terminations occur due to some form of deviant behavior, such 
as violating work rules or acting in a manner in which performance expectations are not met.  
Thus multiple forms of deviance lead to executive termination.  First, executives who fail to 
deliver adequate firm performance, such as through poor decision-making, engage in deviance 
against the firm and its shareholders.  Those without specific ties to the firm (e.g. the general 
population) are un-impacted by this type of deviance, barring a unique circumstance.  Therefore 
the only parties concerned with this type of deviance are those with ties to the firm, and these 
parties possess the power or influence to punish offenders.  As such this termination is based on 
deviance related to executive capability and referred to as a capability termination. 
 Other reasons for executive termination include involvement in scandal or other action 
that negatively impacts how the firm is viewed, such as illegal activity.  Since society has rules 
and expectations in place concerning the general conduct of its citizens, those whose deviance 
goes against these rules impact society as a whole.  Social punishment, as a result of deviant 
action, serves the purpose of defining moral boundaries in society (Matsueda, 2013).  Thus when 
executives violate moral or ethical expectations, they are subject to punishment or sanctions from 
not only those associated with the firm but with the entire society who have put such 
expectations in place.  This type of termination is based on deviance related to an executive’s 
character and herein referred to as character termination.
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Since the power to distribute social punishment depends on the type of deviance, in this 
case character or capability, each type carries with it distinct reputation penalties.  The 
foundation for multiple types of reputation decline arises from two different sociological 
perspectives.  According to the interpretive paradigm “social interaction is an interpretive 
process among interactants” (Matsueda, 2013, 28).  Thus the interpretations of others are based 
on what is observed about them, such as their appearance, demeanor, or outward actions.  Such 
observations do not carry with them literal meanings but rather serve as cues in a perceptive 
process that ultimately creates meaning (e.g. Blumer, 1969; Wilson, 1970).  From this 
perspective the observables about individuals vary in their meaning depending on the context in 
which they are observed and do not conform to hard and fast rules about behavior.  For 
reputation this means there are not rules attached to which actions are deemed acceptable or 
unacceptable and subject to social punishment in the form of reputation decline.  The impact of 
one’s actions on reputation is then influenced more by the characteristics of both the person and 
situation as opposed to generalizable rules or guidelines for behavior. 
The second sociological perspective “assumes social interaction is rule governed” 
(Matsueda, 2013, 28), meaning for reputation there exist actions which are always viewed 
negatively and subject to social sanction.  This normative perspective is based on a system of 
shared meaning (Wilson, 1970) that guides individuals’ perceptions in social interactions.  The 
generalized meaning on one’s actions prompts specific actions and outcomes by others, giving 
less weight to the context surrounding the action.  For example, when an individual violates a 
law of society, such as theft, the action consistently holds specific meaning negative and is 
subject to pre-specified consequences.   
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Early work on social sanctions found that it links individuals together in a common 
response to negative actions by others (Mead, 1918).  Therefore when an individual engages in 
negative action it attacks the shared collective conscience and threatens social order (Durkheim, 
1964).  Social sanction for individual action thus serves two purposes in society.  First, such 
punishment reinforces the collective conscience of a society, and, second, it defines society’s 
moral boundaries to guide future action (Durkheim, 1964).  Thus when people engage in an 
action that is viewed negatively by a social group, the group reinforces their behavioral 
expectations through social sanctions.  When individuals experience reputational decline, it is an 
outcome of the violation of their social group’s expectations. 
Individuals’ actions also create conflict in social interactions.  The first form of conflict 
arises when individuals with the greatest political or economic (financial) power create rules and 
expectations for behavior, in essence determining (1) which actions are deemed “bad” and 
worthy of punishment (e.g. which type of termination actions warrant reputation penalties and 
(2) the actual punishment associated with a specific action (e.g. the level of reputation penalty) 
(Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989).  This type of conflict typically occurs at the societal level.  For 
example, legislators create laws governing the behavior of citizens.  These laws specify which 
behaviors are acceptable and which behaviors violate the established laws.  At the same time 
these laws also specify the consequences associated with violation of established laws.  
Therefore, when individuals break established laws society reinforces its behavioral expectations 
by handing down punishment to the individual violators.    
The second form of conflict arises through organizational processing (also refereed to as 
middle social control agencies) wherein individuals’ actions are subject to the consequences of 
those with power to carry out consequences (Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989).  This conflict arises 
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when individuals violate the expectations of others in their peer group, professional network, 
organization, or other small social group.  This type of conflict does not assume the presence of 
specific rules governing behavior, but rather that collective expectations of members’ behavior 
are present.  For example, in the event one member of a peer group poaches a client from another 
member, this behavior is either deemed acceptable or unacceptable based on the collective 
expectations of this specific peer group.  If the action is deemed acceptable, then no reason exists 
to introduce a social punishment.  However, if the action is deemed unacceptable based on the 
group’s expectations, then the violator is subject to consequence from those with power to 
distribute them. 
It is not a requirement for actual engagement in a negative action but simply being 
viewed as having engaged in negative action that prompts social sanctions (Matsueda, 1992).  
Additionally, while it matters who commits an action worth of social consequence, those who 
perceived themselves to be harmed by an action are also of importance (Becker, 1963).  Thus 
disparate groups experience perceived harm differently.  Therefore, individuals engaging in 
actions that are viewed as violating societal rules are subject to social sanctions by those 
attempting to reinforce the shared social conscience and the moral boundaries.  However, not all 
actions will be relevant to society at large.  In these instances social groups, with their own 
behavioral expectations, hand down social sanctions in accordance with the specific group’s 
norms and expectations.  The power of each of these groups to carry out social sanctions differs 
and the purpose for social sanction also differs.  Therefore, different groups will distribute social 
sanctions at varying levels. 
Social sanctions arise from information signals received by powerful parties.  The 
following section reviews signaling theory and its application to reputation.  The implications of 
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reputation, as a signal of quality, stem from information economics.  Parties to a transaction have 
access to different information about the transaction, and the lack or possession of information 
impacts how the parties interact (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  This difference in information between 
the parties leads them to seek to reduce the resulting asymmetry (Spence, 1973, 2002).  The 
information available to individuals is that which is accessible to the public, but some parties to a 
transaction may obtain private information therein creating stark differences in information 
between parties (Connelly, et al., 2011).  Two types of information asymmetry are present in the 
literature: quality information and intent information (Stiglitz, 2000).  Quality information refers 
to one party not having full information about the characteristics of another party, while intent 
information manifests in a lack of information about another party’s potential behavior 
(Connelly, et al, 2011). 
The individual or firm sending a signal is referred to as a signaler while the receiver is the 
actor or group of actors using a signal as information (Connelly, et al, 2011).  Typically in 
management research receivers are investors (e.g. Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Park & Mezias, 
2005; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009) or potential investors (e.g. Certo, 2003; Gulati & Higgins, 
2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004).  However, other receivers include consumers (Chung & Kalnins, 
2001; Lampel & Shamsie, 2000), competitors (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 
2006; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), shareholders (Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadhar, 
2007; Kang, 2008), and the labor market (Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Ndofor & Levitas, 
2004).  All of these groups represent potential powerful parties capable of responding with social 
sanctions in the event of termination. 
Signals, actions supposed to demonstrate true form, are a means through which receivers 
reduce the information asymmetry between parties (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  For example, an 
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applicant for employment is unable to truly know what it is like to work for the specific firm.  
The individual may desire to reduce the gap between knowing very little about the actual job or 
working conditions and having first-hand experience at the firm.  This can be undertaken by 
reviewing pubic information on locally superior places to work or reading testimonials of current 
employee’s on the firm’s corporate website.  Through these signals the applicant perceives the 
relative quality of the firm, thus influencing reputation assessments, and uses that information to 
make judgments about the firm and aid in deciding whether working for that firm would be 
acceptable. 
Signals take on various forms and include press releases (Carter, 2006), board member 
diversity (Miller & Triana, 2009; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002) and prestige (Certo, 2003), 
founder ownership (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005), and top management team characteristics 
(Cohen & Dean, 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Zimmerman, 2008).  Other signals include 
demographics (Close, et al., 2011), educational background or institution (Zamudio, et al., 2013), 
family name (Rojek, 2001), and prior successful experience (Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 
2009).  As illustration, the characteristics and actions (i.e. signals of quality) of top management 
team members send information to the external environment where various actors use the signals 
to develop perceptions about the acceptability of the TMT (Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
All signals are not created equal, however (e.g. Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Park & Mezias, 
2005).  For example, exploring the relationship between top management teams and the 
decisions of institutional investors, Higgins and Gulati (2006) introduce three types of signals: 
resource, role, and endorsement.  Results suggest that top management team prior work 
experience (signaling access to resources) and firm prestigious partnerships (signaling positive 
endorsement by external actors) have independent and differential impacts on the decisions of 
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institutional investors (Higgins & Gulati, 2006), highlighting the fact that different signals result 
in differential behavior of social actors toward a social object. 
Since violations of societal rules activate needs to reinforce and re-establish social order 
and norms, one primary determinant in the distribution of social punishment is the type of 
violation that occurred.  Terminations are one signal of engagement in an act violating norms.  
Terminations alone do not, however, carry with them specific meaning.    Rather, it is the reason 
for termination that provides meaning to the signal.  Reason for termination also influences 
which groups of individuals experience harm from the norm violation.   
Reasons for termination include failure to maintain satisfactory performance of job 
duties.  While specific CEO behaviors leading to performance are difficult to observe (e.g. 
Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), CEOs bear overall responsibility for the firm.  Thus CEOs are 
terminated for failure to ensure adequate firm performance, sound decision-making, and 
acceptable general management.  This type of termination, a capability termination, concerns the 
CEOs capability to perform the role of CEO adequately, and violating organizational, industry, 
or other normative expectations of the CEO position.  For example, Mark Frissora was 
terminated from Hertz Global Holdings in September 2014 after accounting issues were 
discovered.  Steve Bennett was terminated from Symantec due to declining firm performance 
(e.g. decreased revenue).  Siemens terminated Peter Loescher in mid-2013 amidst declining 
profits and lackluster overall firm performance.  In these cases the individuals experiencing 
perceived harm from these actions are primarily economic actors such as investors, analysts, and 
customers.  
Character terminations include violations of legal or ethical standards as set forth by 
society at large.  Such terminations violate public trust and integrity.  For examples Mark Hurd 
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was terminated for a controversy surrounding relationship with a female contractor.  In 
December of 2014, Dov Charney was terminated based on multiple allegations including failure 
to “stop the publication of nude photos of a former employee who had sued him for sexual 
harassment” (Pollock, 2014, 1).  Finally, in 2007, former CEO of BP John Browne was 
terminated amid perjury accusations.  The individuals perceiving harm in these cases include not 
only economic agents but also social and legal agents.  Social agents include the media and 
watchdog groups, while legal agents include law enforcement, prosecutors, and governmental 
agencies (Wiesenfeldt, Wurthman, & Hambrick, 2008).  
Given terminations are handed down in the event of a harmful action done to the firm, 
they are inherently negative.  Terminations signal to social, economic, and legal agents the need 
to remedy CEOs’ violations.  One form of punishment is decline to the CEO’s reputation through 
the loss of their employment.  Therefore, despite termination for either reason, it is hypothesized 
that such terminated CEOs will have a more difficult time repairing their reputations than those 
who lose their jobs for less damaging reasons.     
H1: Character terminations negatively influence reputation repair. 
H2: Capability terminations negatively influence reputation repair. 
 
Building reputation occurs through such means as media attention to distinctive and 
consistent action (Hayward, et al, 2004), high-quality confirmation of industry norms 
(Parmentier, et al., 2008, 2013), winning awards (Wade, et al, 2006), and demonstrating 
authenticity as a leader (Treadway, et al, 2009).  Rebuilding reputation, on the other hand, has 
yet to receive sufficient attention in the literature and thus little theoretical and empirical 
evidence leaves gaps in our knowledge about processes occurring during reputation repair.  One 
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clear factor delineating reputation building from reputation repair is the presence of a reputation-
damaging event.  Once this event occurs there is no way to remove the event from one’s 
professional history, only the possibility of concealing the event, minimizing the event’s 
exposure, or demonstrating how the event is truly isolated in occurrence and not related to an 
individual’s quality or performance. 
 The type of damaging event not only influences the level of reputation damage but also 
the ease or difficulty of reputation repair, primarily through damage to an executive’s integrity.  
Integrity of leaders is judged based on their perceived commitment to moral and ethical behavior 
(Bauman, 2013).  Lack of integrity is viewed as deviation from stakeholders’ moral 
understanding (Grover & Hasel, 2014).  Stakeholder perceptions of executives, specifically 
reputation, are influenced by both behaviors inside and outside the formal leadership role (Bass 
& Steidlmeier, 1999).  Therefore the extent to which an executive’s behavior, whether or not the 
behavior takes place when the executive is acting in a formal leadership capacity, breaches the 
moral boundaries built by stakeholder groups and alters stakeholders’ integrity perceptions. 
 For example, internal ethical complaints prompted accusations of former CEO of Best 
Buy, Brian Dunn, of having an inappropriate relationship with a young, female colleague.  After 
investigation the board’s audit committee determined that even though both parties denied the 
relationship to be of a romantic nature, Dunn still “demonstrated extremely poor judgment and 
lack of professionalism” and his relationship with this employee “negatively impacted the work 
environment” (Audit Committee, 2012, 1).  This breach of ethical boundaries resulted in Dunn’s 
forced resignation and prompted a furry of media attention regarding Dunn’s integrity as well as 
the integrity of other executives engaging in relationships with employees of lower rank and 
power.  This example typifies integrity as an integral component of the reputation repair process.  
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In other words, for reputation repair to occur, executives “must not only reestablish positive 
expectations, but also overcome negative expectations” (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004, 
104). 
 A character termination specifically questions an executive’s integrity, a hallmark of this 
type of termination.  When integrity is called in to question, trust is violated (e.g. Grover & 
Hasel; 2014; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, et al, 2004).  Two types of trust are of 
particular interest here.  Integrity-based trust refers to perceptions that a focal individual 
conforms to standards deemed acceptable by other individuals (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995).  Competence-basted trust refers to the possession of technical and interpersonal skills 
needed for a particular job or task (Butler & Cantrell, 1984).  Repairing trust takes place through 
such means as apology and acceptance of responsibility in the event of competency-based 
violations, but these behaviors do not repair trust in the event of integrity violations (Kim et al, 
2004, 2006).  Integrity violations are also judged more harshly when the violator held substantial 
power (Doherty, Dowling, &Miller, 2011).  These findings suggest it is more difficult to repair 
one’s reputation after a character termination as opposed to a capability termination.  Therefore it 
is suggested that with capability terminations are more likely to repair their reputations than 
CEOs with character terminations.   
H3: CEOs terminated for character-damaging events are less likely to repair their 
reputations than CEOs terminated for capability reasons.     
 
Factors influencing reputation repair 
Since identical actions do not carry the same level of punishment, multiple factors 
influence an individual’s change in reputation.  These include the specific characteristics of the 
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individual, the conformity of actions to that deemed positive by society, the quality or 
performance of an individual, and the increase or decrease in relational status of an individual to 
other actors.  Table 1 summarizes the theoretical foundations of each function of reputation.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Executive traits and characteristics  
First, according to status characteristics theory, status characteristics represent features of 
individuals that are used to build expectations and beliefs of the focal individual (Berger, Fisek, 
& Norman, 1989).  Introduced by Berger, Fisek, and Norman (1966), an underlying assumption 
holds that individuals use status organizing processes, referring to differing cognitions among 
individuals that influence their evaluations of other individuals in a social context.  In these 
cognitive processes status characteristics serve as cues about individuals (Bunderson, 2003), and 
the social meaning of each characteristic informs external actors of the expectations then placed 
on focal individual (Balkwell, 1994; Berger, et al., 1980b).  In other words, the specific 
characteristics of an individual inform the expectations others hold of him.  Based on this, 
societal inequalities influence the level of power, influence, and ultimately reputation of 
individuals (Lucas, 2003).   
The theory posits that performance expectations based on the characteristics of 
individuals (e.g. gender, national origin, educational background, etc.) lead to their relative social 
power and prestige, which, in turn, influences social outcomes (Berger, et al., 1972; Berger, et 
al., 1977; Berger, et al., 1980a).  Another way to view this, given actual quality cannot in its 
entirety be directly observed, expectations of quality are formed through observable 
characteristics and the relationship those observable characteristics have with socially dictated 
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quality (Bunderson & Barton, 2011).  For example, in an experiment Lucas (2003) finds that 
male leaders (gender status characteristic) tend to have more influence on outcomes than female 
leaders, but after the institutionalization of female leaders women had as much influence on 
outcomes in leadership positions as their male counterparts.  This also demonstrates that the 
social meaning attached to characteristics is malleable.   
Other examples further illustrate the impact of status characteristics on social perceptions 
and judgments.  Anderson, John, Keltner, and Kring (2001) investigate personality and 
attractiveness as status characteristics.  Results indicate that extroversion is positively related to 
social approval for both men and women.  Finally, Bunderson (2003) discusses the difference 
between two types of status characteristic cues: diffuse and specific.  The former refers to cues 
based on social category while the latter refers to cues based a task.  These cues have differential 
impacts on the attributions of expertise on individuals based on tenure and other group 
characteristics.  Bunderson (2003) finds that specific cues related to a task are positively related 
to expertise attributions in decentralized, long-tenured groups while diffuse cues related to social 
category are positively related to expertise attributions in centralized, short-tenured groups.  
These studies highlight the role of individual characteristics in altering the perceptions of social 
actors.  Two different executive characteristics are proposed to influence the perceptions of 
terminated executives, thus altering the level of reputation decline.  These characteristics include 
minority status, specifically gender and nationality, and attractiveness.  
CEOs vary in their observable characteristics.  One visible executive characteristic is 
minority status (i.e. gender, race, nationality).  A 1995 study found 97 percent of senior 
managers of the largest 100 industrial firms and Fortune 500 firms were white (Rosenblat, 1995).  
Similarly, in 1992 CEOs were asked the likelihood their firm would have a female CEO in the 
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next decade (by 2002), and only 2 percent responded that it would be likely or very likely 
(Fisher, 1992).  Statistics like this signal to society that being a white male is synonymous with 
being a good leader.  For example, certain minority characteristics are associated with lack of 
skills or incompetence, such a person acting “feminine” being rated as less competent than 
someone acting “masculine” (Jamieson, 1995).  Minority status is also associated with 
differences in communication interpretation, where assertiveness in male communication styles 
is valued more highly (Oakley, 2000).  This leads to stereotypes of those further away from the 
leader type perceived to be most successful.  Thus, those who do not fit the fit the prototypical 
tone of voice or mode of dress are preemptively assumed to be less successful than those who fit 
the prototype. 
 There are consequences associated with failing to fit the prototypical mold in a 
transaction.  First, such individuals are treated differently in negotiations, primarily through 
lower monetary offers yet with greater performance demands than their majority counterparts 
(Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999).  Multiple field studies provide further evidence of the differential 
treatment between minority and majority members.  These studies, conducted through auto 
purchase transactions, found minorities received higher initial and ending prices than did those 
belonging to the majority (Ayres, 1991; 1995; Ayres & Siegelman, 1995).  Such studies 
highlight that perceptions of minorities influence how they are viewed and how they are treated.  
Those not fitting the successful manager prototype are also subject to greater scrutiny 
than those with characteristics more closely associated with managerial success (Rosener, 1995).  
In the presence of a ratio of minority to majority that is highly skewed in the direction of the 
majority, those in the minority are subject to more scrutiny and pressure primarily because they 
stand out so much and thus draw attention to themselves (though not necessarily on purpose) and 
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this increased attention creates additional pressures to maintain good performance (Oakley, 
2000).  This indicates that those who don’t fit the typical mold of CEO get more attention simply 
because they don’t fit that mold, and this increases their exposure making any failure stand out 
more. 
Implicit leadership theories of what the successful manager “looks like” influences the 
expectations held about minority managers (e.g. Ryan & Haslam, 2007; Schein, 1973, 1975).  
Leadership prototypes are the foundation of individuals’ perceptions of leaders and their 
behavior (Lord & Maher, 1990).  The incongruity arising from difference in appearance for 
minority mangers leads to decreased favorableness in evaluation as potential leaders as well as 
decreased favorableness in evaluation of minority managers’ behaviors as managers.  Since less 
powerful groups are typically singled out for more severe social punishments (e.g. Paternoster & 
Iovanni, 1989), it is posited that the minority status of CEOs increases the level of reputation 
decline after being terminated, regardless of the reason for termination, because these individuals 
are not viewed to possess the appropriate characteristics of successful managers coupled with 
their increased visibility compared to majority status CEOs.      
H4: Minority CEOs are less likely to repair their reputations after a reputation-
damaging event. 
 
The second characteristic of interest is the attractiveness of managers.  It is well 
established in the literature that one’s level of attractiveness matters when people make 
judgments about them as well as how they are treated (Langlois, et al, 2000).  However, 
attractive individuals do not necessarily act differently than unattractive individuals (Solnick & 
Schweitzer, 1999).  Attractiveness then serves as an information source in perceptual processes, 
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leading to differential treatment based on the meanings attached to attractiveness.  Thus, 
attractiveness is a status characteristic for managers.  For example, people assume more positive 
interactions with attractive others (Snyder, 1984), indicating one way in which attractiveness 
influences reactions to a person. 
Other positive meanings are attached to attractiveness.  First, people assume attractive 
individuals have more socially appropriate personalities (Dermer & Thiel, 1975; Dion, 
Berscheid, & Walster, 1972).  Second, attractiveness also influences attributions of ability (Beehr 
& Gilmore, 1982).  Third, attractiveness is also associated with perceived occupational and 
interpersonal competence as well as social appeal  (Langlois, et al, 2000).  Finally, attractive 
individuals’ academic competence is viewed more favorably than unattractive individuals 
(Jackson, Hunter, & Hodge, 1995).  Taken together, attractiveness positively influences 
perceptions held of others in multiple ways.  One potential reason for this is that attractive 
individuals have more confidence in their abilities (Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006) and stronger core 
self-evaluations (Judge, Hurst, & Simon, 2009).   
Yet attractiveness does not stop at influencing perceptions of others as it influences how 
individuals are treated as well.  Attractive individuals are more likely to earn more money 
(Judge, et al., 2009) both in terms of starting salary and future earnings, with the largest effects 
on earnings later in one’s career (Frieze, Olson, & Russell, 1991).  In fact, in a study of MBA 
graduates, Frieze and colleagues (1991) found attractive men and women earned $2,600 and 
$2,150 per year more for each unit increase in attractiveness, with attractiveness measured on a 
five-point scale.  Thus a highly attractive male MBA graduate (rated as five) earned $10,000 
more per year than an unattractive male MBA graduate (rated as one).  These sharp contrasts 
between attractive and unattractive individuals extend in to other areas outside of pay. 
 33
First, attractiveness positively impacts supportive resources for academic achievement 
and subsequently educational attainment (Judge, et al, 2009).  Second, attractive individuals are 
less likely to receive punishment or negative feedback (Langlois, et al, 2000) while unattractive 
individuals are more likely to received negative judgment and treatment from others.  Third, 
attractiveness is negatively associated with remedial action in the event of poor performance 
(Elovitz & Salvia, 1982).  Subsequently, this leads to the perception of greater constraint for 
unattractive individuals and lesser constraint for attractive individuals and finally better 
treatment of those deemed attractive by society’s standards.  Also, judgments in one area tend to 
generalize to other areas (Kroska & Harkness, 2006), so since attractive individuals are view 
positively this spills over to other positive judgments.   
Attractiveness therefore goes beyond simply impacting the opinions of others though to 
actually influences how such individuals are treated, with attractive individuals treated better 
compared to unattractive individuals (Langlois, et al, 2000).  Differential treatment takes place 
both knowingly and unknowingly, and the level of familiarity does not influence this treatment 
(e.g. people treat an attractive stranger the same as they would an attractive friend) (Langlois, et 
al, 2000).  One reason for this is that attractive people tend to feel more confident in their 
abilities and are typically considered more popular in social circles (Langlois, et al, 2000).   
 The impact of attractiveness on selection underscores its value in predicting executive 
reputation repair.  First, attractive individuals are more likely selected for jobs than their less 
attractive counterparts (Diboye, Arvey, & Terpstra, 1977).  Starting salary is also influenced by 
candidate attractiveness (Dipboye, Fromkin, & Wiback, 1975).  Recent research provides 
evidence that attractiveness acts as a differentiating mechanism in executive candidate pools 
(Cook & Mobbs, 2014).  Additionally, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the market 
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responds positively to the announcement of attractive CEOs, evidenced by higher abnormal 
returns after such announcements (Cook & Mobbs, 2014).  
 Attractiveness’ impact on selection stems from implicit personality theory.  Accordingly, 
individuals build cognitive structures based on others’ personal characteristics and how those 
personal characteristics relate to each another (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991).  
Further, social categories are tied to specific personalities and personal characteristics (Ashmore 
& Del Boca, 1979) and these social categories prompt inferences about the characteristics 
possessed by another (Ashmore, 1981).  Thus possessing certain characteristics activates ties to 
other characteristics, such as a person large in stature viewed to be also strong and powerful.  
Since attractiveness is linked to such attributes as social skills and intelligence (Eagly, et al, 
1991), attractive individuals are viewed more positively in these areas.  In the context of 
selection, the relationship between attractiveness and other positive characteristics of exemplar 
employees influences their viability as candidates.  Therefore, attractive CEOs are linked to more 
positive characteristics of executive-level employees, and are thus more likely to be selected for 
new positions, mitigating the impact of a reputation-damaging event.  It is then posited that 
attractive terminated CEOs will be viewed less negatively than unattractive CEOs and more apt 
to repair their reputations. 
H5:  Physically attractive CEOs are more likely to repair their reputations after a 
reputation-damaging event. 
 
Relational Status   
The relationships one has in the corporate elite are quite valuable (e.g. Fich & 
Shivdassani, 2007; Westphal & Stern, 2006).  Being associated with such impacts resource 
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access (Cowen & Marcell, 2011), compensation and employment opportunities (Graffin, Wade, 
Porac, McNamee, 2008), directorship opportunities (Westphal & Stern, 2007), and other 
benefits.  These relationships also influence both norms of behavior and group identity (Useem, 
1982).   Members of the corporate elite are subject to social sanctions and rewards based on their 
decisions and behavior (Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Westphal & Khanna, 2003) that either align or 
deviate from established expectations resulting in a form of social control.  Social control can be 
either formal or informal in nature (Black, 1984), and reputation represents an informal form of 
social control.  Therefore, reputation changes in response to the nature of relationships one has 
developed.  
The primary relational mechanism of interest is CEO power as power changes the nature 
of social relationships and the ability of others to influence social control.  Power refers to the 
capacity to exert one’s own will (Finkelstein, 1992).  CEO power stems from large ownership of 
a firm (Zhang, 2008), long tenure (Shen, 2003), or holding the positions of both CEO and 
chairman of the board (Zhu & Chen, 2014).  CEOs terminated for character violations create 
collective rulemaking conflict, hallmarked by a power struggle between members of society (e.g. 
Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989).  Powerful CEOs are in a unique position to influence their own 
outcomes, but in the face of a character violation the power struggle between those in the 
position of authority to hand down social sanctions and a power CEO only increases.  Therefore, 
powerful CEOs will need substantial sanction to remedy their violation in order to reinforce 
society’s behavioral boundaries.   
 In the case of a CEO’s termination, a smaller stakeholder group determines the 
appropriate social sanction.  This group consists of individuals with more in-depth knowledge of 
the CEO’s responsibilities, limitations, and strengths.  This group thus has a different perspective 
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on a termination than that of the general population.  Powerful CEOs are viewed as more 
competent and more influential than other executives, so their actions are weighed differently.  
The groups responsible for conferring social sanctions on CEOs after a capability violation are 
using different information to determine the appropriate sanction than those stakeholders 
activated in a character violation.  Due to this group’s familiarity with the CEO, their sanctions 
require less punishment to achieve reinforced expectations and boundaries.  Additionally, CEOs 
with power have a larger capacity to retaliate for negative information exchanged in their peer 
group (Bolton, Grenier, & Ockenfels, 2013).  Thus in the event of a capability violation, CEO 
power weakens the impact of a termination event on an executive’s reputation. 
H6:  Powerful CEOs are more likely to repair their reputations after a reputation-
damaging event. 
 
Technical efficacy 
 Reputation has long been viewed as a function of performance and quality (Lange, et al., 
2011).  The literature strongly suggests that reputation judgments are largely influenced by 
signals of quality and superior performance (e.g. Fich & Shivdasani, 2007; Fombrun & Van Riel, 
2004; Fryxell & Wang, 1994; Srinivasan, 2005).  Based on that it is also well established that the 
signals performance and quality signals to which audiences are attuned can vary greatly.  In the 
case of CEO termination from employment, the media can alter this signal through its coverage 
of event thereby impacting the meaning attached to the signal termination sends.  Additionally, 
the actions other firms take in regard to their CEOs who engage in similar deviant behavior can 
influence the signal termination sends as well.  The following section examines how the meaning 
attached to termination signals is altered. 
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Media influence   
The meaning of social objects is not simply determined by characteristics of the object 
itself but also the process of meaning constructions (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997).  Such a 
process takes the form of sensemaking by stakeholders wherein blame for negative action is 
assigned to terminated individuals.  Blame is not simply applied based solely on the fact of 
termination, but rather it is guided by both rational analysis and individual biases (Wiesenfeldt, 
et al, 2008).  Thus factors related to the dissemination of information to stakeholders as well as 
factors influencing the activation or enhancement of individual biases warrant investigation in 
examining the meaning associated with executive termination.   
The first factor of interest concerns the media’s role in the sensemaking process of 
meaning creation.  First, individuals’ feelings about people or objects change in the presence of 
new events and information (Smith-Lovin, 1988).  Information intermediaries, also know as 
infomediaries, include both individuals and groups responsible for disseminating and brokering 
information in social space (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009).  Since the media, and primarily 
popular press, serves the primary function of disseminating information to the public at large, it 
is an important factor to consider in shaping the attitudes and perceptions of executive 
termination.   
There are multiple ways the media influences the meaning creation process.  First, in 
making information public, the media provides potentially new information that confirms or 
denies current perceptions about executives.  Second, the media’s coverage of an event provides 
more noise in which to sift through to arrive at meaning for an event.  Third, the media’s 
information impacts specific individual biases, including availability bias, attributional biases, 
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and emotional biases.  Taken together, the media plays a large role in the construction of 
meaning surrounding executive termination. 
The media influences individuals’ perceptions of the appropriateness of managerial 
action (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009; Pollock & Rindova, 2003).  Since media attention includes 
positive, negative, or neutral information, positive media attention is the first part of the media’s 
role is shaping meaning.  For example, since goodwill positively influences affective responses 
(Zajonc, 1980), positive media attention confers a level of goodwill to media subjects, and in this 
case to CEOs, that positively alters perceptions of a CEO.  A greater amount of positive 
information then lessens the negative impact of CEO termination on executive reputation.  
Greater amounts of positive media attention also create a veil over the reasons concerning 
termination.  When the termination is announced, little other information is available to 
stakeholders.  As the media reports additional information, the announcement itself is temporally 
moved further back.  Thus, the media’s reported information becomes the most recent 
information available to stakeholders during the sensemaking process.  Recent information is 
viewed as the most relevant or reliable during processing, leading to availability bias (Tyversky 
& Kahneman, 1974).  Thus if the most recent information is primarily positive, individuals are 
biased toward positive perceptions.  
H7:  The amount of positive media attention positively influences CEO reputation repair. 
 
Negative media attention also influences the meaning attached to executive termination.   
First, negative media attention increases internal attributions and leads to greater negative 
judgments (Ross, 1977).  When executives are terminated due to an individual choice of violate 
societal rules or not, such individuals are portrayed as villains with self-serving motives.  
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Second, evidence suggests firms announce negative events more quickly in the presence of 
possible litigation threats (Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2002; Kasznik & Lev, 1995; 
Skinner, 1994, 1997).  The prompt release of negative information serves the purposes of 
facilitating transparency and reassuring stakeholders that events are being acknowledged and 
presently handled.  When CEOs engage in a character violation it create threats of litigation or 
other regulatory action, such as in the event of legal action in response to harassment allegations 
or law enforcement presence in response to embezzlement.   
Finally, emotions matter in making judgments (Kahneman, 2003).  The release of 
negative information heightens an emotional bias of pleasure in others’ misfortune, commonly 
referred to as schadenfreude (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997; Feather & Sherman, 
2002; Smith et al., 1996).  Multiple studies drawn on Nietzche’s (1911, 1967) discussion of 
schadenfreude as compensation for lower social approval, ultimately resulting in prejudice 
against a social object (e.g. Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003; Leach & Spears, 2008; 
Smith, et al, 1996).  Not only do individual emotions influence meaning attachment and 
subsequent behavior, group-based emotions also lead to social perceptions and social interaction 
(e.g. Leach & Spears, 2008). 
Experiencing pleasure from others’ misfortune has multiple antecedents.  First envy, an 
emotion of mixed pain and pleasure (e.g. Neu, 1980) is a strong influence in the activation of this 
bias (Smith, et al, 1996).  Second, the deservingness of negative outcomes impacts how much 
pleasure people draw from others’ misfortunes (Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, & Goslinga, 2009).  
Third, dislike-based anger (Hareli & Weiner, 2002) and illegitimacy-based anger (Feather & 
Sherman, 2002) toward a successful person heighten pleasure when a successful person fails.  
These studies support the idea that the setbacks of high achievers are consistently pleasing to 
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others (e.g. Feather, 1989, 1991; Feather, Volkmer, & McKee, 1991).  Even more, the pleasing 
nature of such achievers’ setbacks impacts perceptions of deservingness of setback (Feather, 
1989) and the likability of the person (Feather, et al, 1991).  Thus the more negative information 
the media portrays blaming the terminated executive, it leads to increased attention and scrutiny 
from the public (e.g. Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) and the more social-comparison based emotions 
(Smith, et al, 1996) are evoked.   
In summary firms are more likely to release negative information in the face of potential 
litigation, negative media attention of executive termination creates greater attention to the event 
and critical evaluation of the executive, and society desires to see executives suffer social 
punishment for violation of society’s rules.  Therefore, it is posited that greater negative media 
attention activates social and emotional biases that strengthen the impact of termination on an 
executive’s reputation in the event of a character violation. 
H8:  CEOs with greater negative media attention are less likely to repair their 
reputations after a reputation-damaging event. 
 
Termination prevalence  
While the meaning attached to termination is influenced by the media’s coverage of the 
events, environmental factors also contribute to the outcomes related to employment termination.  
The prevalent reason for termination, environmental favorableness, and the terminating firm’s 
industry social categorization are all hypothesized to impact the level of reputation decline 
conferred to terminated executives. 
 Sensational and dramatic events require sustained attention and possess the potential to 
influence social matters (Pride, 1995).  However, social attention is a resource in short supply, 
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and individuals cannot attend to all information equally (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988).  Common or 
routine events thus draw less attention.  From a neuroscience perspective, information processing 
limits of the human brain require selection of specific stimuli to which to attend (Lavie, 1995), 
or, in other words, attention cannot be paid to all information at once so mental processes 
determine which information is most important to which to attend.  Thus some information and 
events garner attention while others do not.  Attention is also limited by perceived mental effort 
requirements to maintain attention (Lavie, 1995).  Therefore events requiring sustained attention 
push processing capacities further.  As such, repeated executive terminations for identical or 
similar circumstances require additional processing than events occurring in isolation (e.g. novel 
or startling events).  These events are then less likely to receive attention.   
Since consequences of attention include attributions and judgments (Malle & Pierce, 
2001), less attention paid to an event impacts the causal attributions and subsequent judgments of 
the event.  Furthermore, when multiple similar others are terminated for the same reasons and 
around the same time periods, the practice is viewed more universally acceptable (e.g. Westphal, 
Gulati, & Shortell, 1997) and subsequently less damaging.  It is therefore posited that greater 
prevalence of capability-based executive terminations decreases attention paid to such 
terminations, thus limiting its impact on executive reputation.         
H10:  Greater prevalence of CEO terminations positively impacts CEO reputation repair 
after a reputation-damaging event.  
 
Symbolic Conformity 
 Social audiences hold admiration for those that conform to cultural norms (Kraatz & 
Love, 2006).  Thus good reputations result from behavior consistent with expected societal 
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values, and reputations decline when behavior deviates from the same (Love & Kraatz, 2009).  
For example, reputation was enhanced when popular management techniques of the time were 
adopted (Staw & Epstein, 2000).  Executives who are terminated that actively participate in 
socially desirable endeavors demonstrate conformity to societal values.  Civic activity represents 
one area where executives can reaffirm their commitment to cultural norms and expectations.               
Repudiation techniques   
After termination occurs, executives influence the reputation repair process though the 
activities in which participate.  Activities that uncouple the executive from the termination in the 
eyes of stakeholders positively influence reputation repair.  In order to influence reputation 
repair, these activities should positively impact one or more reputation dimensions: being known, 
being known for something, and generalized favorability.  For example, terminated executives 
are known for both the acts leading to their termination as well as the termination outcome itself.  
Since the most recent information about an individual is deemed to be the most accurate and 
relevant (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), engaging in activities that associate the executive 
with behaviors and outcomes more in line with stakeholder expectations will improve the 
executive’s reputation.  One such activity is civic service. 
 Executives engage in multiple types of civic activity.  Serving as a board member for a 
not-for-profit organization, for example, creates visibility as a civic leader.  Executives that 
increase their participation charities or not-for-profits also increase the visibility while aligning 
themselves with positive activities.  Earning awards for active involvement in civic activities, 
such as awards for charitable fundraising, creates positive associations between the executive 
and civic service.  Finally, working for a not-for-profit organization in a paid capacity serves to 
signal the values of an executive, values that are more positive than those associated with the 
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termination.  Therefore, executives who engage in civic service activities separate themselves 
from the label attached to termination and are able to repair their reputations through the creation 
of more positive associations.            
H10: CEOs engaging in civic leadership are more likely to repair their reputations after 
a reputation-damaging event. 
H11:  CEOs engaging in civic employment are more likely to repair their reputations 
after a reputation-damaging event.
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources 
 Data was collected from multiple secondary sources including BoardEx and Compustat.  
First, BoardEx, provided by private research company Management Diagnostics Limited, 
contains biographical profiles on both C-suite executives and boards of directors dating back to 
1999.  More than 800,000 organizations across the globe are included in the database, updated 
daily by more than 250 analysts.  BoardEx profiles include the areas of demographics, education, 
employment history, director history, and social activities.  Demographic profiles include 
descriptive information such as gender, age, and nationality.  Education profiles provide 
information on universities attended, dates attended, and degrees obtained.  Employment history 
includes positions held, position descriptions and types, dates in positions, and basic identifiers 
of each employer.  Director history includes total number of current and past quoted, private, and 
other (e.g. not-for profit, charity, etc.) board service; time in role and company; average board 
tenure; individual committee membership; and board position.  Characteristics about the focal 
board (e.g. number of directors, committee structures) are also included.  Social information 
includes networked relationships among profiles, awards received (business and non-business 
related), membership in social clubs, civic service activities, and charities to which the individual 
belongs or with which is associated.  Information on some individuals dates as far back as 1926 
(Chidambaran, Kedia, Prabhala, 2011).  
 Dependent variables.  Executive profile information was matched to financial and 
economic data from Compustat.  Compustat information of interest includes executive 
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compensation and firm financials.  Given the abundance of missing information from BoardEx 
on U.S. firms prior to 2000, following other studies (e.g. Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2013; 
Fracassi & Tate, 2012) any matched data prior to this date was excluded, leaving the sample 
period from 2000 to 2014.               
 Independent variables.  Physical attractiveness data came from executive photographs 
found on corporate websites, annual reports, or media articles citing the executive.  Data on 
media attention came from web searches of popular press articles from newspapers, magazines, 
and trade journals.  Newspapers include the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Washington 
Post, and USA Today.  Magazines include Newsweek, Time, and Bloomberg, while trade journals 
included the Wall Street Journal.  Since many of the executives in the sample did not work for 
large, publicly traded firms and thus not represented in publications with national readership, 
articles were also collected for local newspapers and magazines such as the Kokomo Tribune 
(Indiana) or The Daily Reporter (Wisconsin).   
Models 
 Model summaries, including the dependent, independent, and moderator variables of 
interest, and measures are provided in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Measures 
Dependent variables.  One important aspect of this study is the investigation of different 
types of reputation-influencing factors simultaneously in order to determine which is really the 
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greatest influence on changing one’s reputation.  Thus the measure for reputation repair needs to 
be able to encompass the all.  For example, if this study used measures such as awards then it 
would only make sense to test the performance mechanisms.  Additionally the assumptions 
underlying the logic of these measures must be addressed.  First, in the labor market for 
executives, CEO is the highest attainable position.  Therefore, CEOs have the highest reputations 
of those in executive positions.  Second, getting fired damages one’s reputation because it is a 
socially undesirable outcome and a signal of lesser quality.  So the reputation repair measure is 
based on whether an executive was able to “get back what they lost” either at any level (i.e. 
getting a job) or a high level (i.e. getting another CEO job, where the person started).  Thus the 
new job actually is a proxy for the executive’s new reputation in the executive labor market.  
Therefore, presence of reputation repair was measured in two different ways.  First, 
obtained employment was measured as obtaining another job after termination and is an 
indication of repairing one’s reputation.  Therefore the first measure of reputation repair was 
coded as 1 if the CEO obtained another job after the termination event and 0 otherwise.  
Employment after termination is indicative of third party endorsement (i.e. endorsement by the 
employing firm) of the CEO, and prior studies have suggested third party endorsement has a 
substantial role in reputation change (e.g. Love & Kraatz, 2009; Rhee & Valdez, 2009).  Given 
prior studies have not measured reputation repair the choice of reputation repair measure was 
based primarily on the mechanisms identified in prior reputation damage studies.  Importantly, 
this measure of reputation repair is specifically for the presence of any repair, while the next 
measure is for the level of repair.   
The second dependent measure of interest is level of reputation repair.  First, the type of 
job CEOs obtained was classified by job title:  CEO, president, executive, vice president, 
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manager, or other.  All terminated executives who obtained a new job with the title of CEO 
(obtained CEO job) were coded as 1 and all others, whether they obtained employment with a 
different job title or did not obtain employment at all, were coded as zero.  Terminated 
executives who obtained new employment as CEOs would represent those with the greatest level 
of reputation repair since these positions are the closest to that which they held prior to the 
reputation-damaging event. 
Independent variables.  Since executives are typically not listed as “terminated” in 
announcements (Taylor, 2010), it necessitated a determination of voluntary in involuntary 
turnover.  Similar to other studies (e.g. Nguyen, 2012), both media coverage of the event and the 
announcements themselves were searched.  In order to obtain media content specific to the 
executive of interest, an Internet search was conducted using the executive’s first and last name, 
company name, and CEO.  Once collected, articles were searched for phrases such as “forced 
resignation”, “forced out”, “dismissed for cause”, and “asked to step down” to ascertain whether 
or not the executive was actually terminated.  Once a turnover event was classified as a 
termination, it was coded in to one of three categories.   Capability termination was coded as one 
if the executive was terminated in the wake of poor firm performance, poor decision-making, or 
poor leadership and zero otherwise.  A termination event was coded as a character termination if 
the executive was dismissed for allegedly or actually committing illegal or unethical acts such as 
embezzlement or other theft, harassment or inappropriate relationships, or ethical violations of 
firm values and zero otherwise.  Other termination was coded as one if the executive was 
dismissed for such reasons as disagreement with the board or the board electing to “take another 
direction”.  
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Gender was coded as one if the CEO was a female and zero otherwise.  Nationality was 
coded as one if the executive was from a country outside of the United States and thus a national 
minority (e.g. China, India).  All other executives were coded as zero.   
For executive attractiveness, photographs are a common means in research by which to 
determine attractiveness (Langlois, et al, 2000).  Only facial information was presented in 
photographs for multiple reasons.  Both facial and bodily attractiveness have independent 
influence on physical attractiveness ratings and bodily ratings reflect the specific clothing worn 
by the individual (e.g. Confer & Perilloux, & Buss, 2010; Currie & Little, 2009).  Following 
other studies (e.g. Commissio & Finkelstein, 2012; Frieze, et al, 1991; Judge, et al, 2009; Scott 
& Judge, 2013), three different individuals were asked to rate their opinion of the attractiveness 
level of the executive in a photograph on a scale of 1 (very unattractive) to 5 (very attractive).  A 
second measure of attractiveness asked raters to determine the degree of facial characteristics 
match comparing the executive’s photograph with a scientific mask of the ideal face.  Raters 
were only shown one photograph at a time to avoid comparing attractiveness between 
executives.  Overall attractiveness score was computed using the average attractiveness rating 
across the three rater responses.  Table 3 provides a summary of the studies with which the 
attractiveness measure was developed. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
CEO power in the labor market was measured using three different measures.  First, the 
influence that CEOs possess amongst their peer groups and broader network is indicative of their 
power.  CEOs with larger networks possess greater reach of influence.  Thus CEO power was 
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measured using the size of a CEO’s network connections as reported in BoardEx (network size).  
Second, the number of CEO positions held by the focal executive is an indication of their breadth 
of experience in the top job of organizations.  Finally, CEOs who recently held the position of 
CEO prior to the position from which they were terminated indicate their consistency in strategic 
leadership (previous CEO).    
Both positive and negative media attention were measured using LIWC software.  Such 
software allows for a qualitative form of analysis by procedurally categorizing text (Weber, 
1990).  Computer-aided text analysis was selected for this study for multiple reasons.  First, text 
analysis software has been used in the analysis of media articles, transcribed conversations, and 
books for multiple studies in the areas of politics (Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004a), ethics 
(Rogers, Dillard, & Yuthas, 2005), organizational performance (Hunter, 2003), and leadership 
(Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004b) because the dictionaries developed for text analysis software 
are able to analyze virtually all forms of text (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  This flexibility is 
of importance to this study, as turnover announcements and executive media coverage vary in 
form and structure.  Second, text analysis software enabled me to capture latent constructs that 
would otherwise not be identified by narrative analysis (Kabanoff, Waldersee, & Cohen, 1995).  
Finally, computer-aided text analysis significantly limits the potential for researcher bias (Barr, 
Stimpert, & Huff, 1992), thereby offering greater reliability and validity as compared to just 
narrative analysis conducted by human coders (Morris, 1994). 
LIWC analyzes text by categorizing each word of a text file by comparing the word with 
dictionaries, “a collection of words that define a particular category” (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 
2010, 27).  For example, if a sentence starts with the word “it”, LIWC determines if “it” matches 
any dictionaries, then codes it as personal pronoun, pronoun, and functional word (Tausczik & 
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Pennebaker, 2010).  After comparing all of the words in a specific text, the percentage of each 
category is calculated.  Positive media attention was measured by the percentage of positive 
emotion words across all media articles discussing a CEO termination event.  Negative media 
attention was measured by the percentage of negative emotion words across all media articles 
discussing a CEO termination event.  Amount of media coverage was not measured using LIWC.  
Media amount was measured as the count of articles that discussed a CEO termination event.  
Articles that only mentioned the CEO was no longer with a firm or that only discussed an 
incoming CEO were excluded because they were not written about the focal CEO. 
 Following other studies on practice prevalence (e.g. Love & Kraatz, 2009), capability 
termination prevalence was measured using the percentage of capability terminations during the 
previous year.  Only one year prior was selected because more recent termination information is 
viewed as the most relevant in the minds of social actors (e,g, Tyversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
 CEO civic service was measured in two ways.  First, civic leadership was measured using 
total board seats at organizations classified as charities as listed in BoardEx.  Second, civic 
employment was measured using “other employment” as listed in BoardEx for all positions 
classified as charities.  This refers to paid positions held by the executive at charitable 
organizations.  These positions were not used to determine whether or not the CEO obtained new 
employment, the primary event of interest.   
Control variables.  CEO age was measured to account for terminated CEOs who are 
close to retirement age, since being close to retirement age may prompt executives to withdraw 
from the labor market and decide not to seek further employment.  CEO qualifications were 
measured as the number of educational degrees and professional certifications held by a CEO as 
reported in BoardEx.  For example, a CEO with bachelors and masters degrees as well as holding 
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a CFA designation was coded as three, while a CEO with only a bachelor’s degree was coded as 
one.  CEOs who start their own firms after termination have the potential to re-enter the 
workforce faster despite reputation damage, so CEOs whose job after termination was at a firm 
founded by the former CEO then it was coded as one and zero otherwise.      
Method to predict reputation repair 
 Models.    Survival analysis will be used to predict the CEO re-employment.  Instead of 
the typical employment of survival analysis to determine time to failure, this method will be used 
to predict time to hire.   In a survival model the purpose is to examine the implications of various 
independent variables on the likelihood of an event, here obtaining employment after 
termination.  The hazard rate is impacted by the independent variables of interest where the 
likelihood of getting a job at any given point in time t is of interest.  This study utilized a 
proportional hazard model with the assumption that the likelihood of obtaining employment is 
generally equal at all times.  In other words, former CEOs can be reemployed at any firm, at any 
time, for any reason.  An exponential distribution was used for all models in this study based (1) 
on visual examination of the data and time periods in which the event of interest occurred and (2) 
the model fit for the data based on the smoothed hazard rate (graph) and chi-square values for 
each model.   
 Multiple types of events were of interest for this study.  The first event of interest 
(referred to as event 1) was obtaining new employment after termination.  The second event of 
interest was obtaining employment as a CEO after termination (referred to as event 2).  Other 
events that occurred during the sample period were considered censoring events, such as not 
obtaining employment during the same period or starting an incarceration.  In this study fixed 
censoring was used with pre-specified time durations of 10 years, or 520 weeks.  Fixed 
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censoring, also referred to as Type I censoring, is appropriate when the observed random 
variable (i.e. obtaining new employment) has the potential to take a substantially long time and 
waiting for such observation interferes with the study (Miller, 1998).  In this case, waiting to 
observe CEO re-employment for a long period of time limits the availability of data for the study 
in that recent years data would need to be dropped.  
 All time periods were recorded in weeks until reemployment given the potential 
inaccuracy of daily announcements.  Therefore, all time periods were based on 7-day intervals.  
For example, if an individual obtained new employment two days after the termination, the event 
would be coded during period 1 (week one).  If an individual obtained new employment ten days 
after the termination, the event would be coded during period 2  (week two).
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V. RESULTS 
All correlations are reported in Tables 5 and 6, but care needs to be taken in interpreting any 
correlations as some individuals in the sample lost and obtained multiple jobs and are thus 
repeated.    
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Of the 487 CEO terminations, approximately 63 percent obtained a new job within the sample 
period while 37 percent did not obtain other employment.  This is quite similar to other recent 
work on CEO terminations.  Nguyen (2012) reported 62 percent of CEOs were reemployed 
during the sample period while 38 percent did not find new employment. Figures 1 and 2 are 
graphs of the hazard rates for models 1 and 2, respectively.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the exponential proportional hazard models 1 and 2, and all 
coefficients are reported as odds ratios.  Such coefficients are commonly used given their 
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interpretation (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008).  For every one-unit change in an 
independent variable, the odds ratio represents the proportional change in the hazard rate 
(probability of getting a new job).  Coefficients less than one indicate a decrease in the hazard 
rate (a negative association) meaning longer time spent in the sample.  Coefficients greater than 
one indicate an increase in the hazard rate (a positive association).  Thus an odds ratio less than 
one indicates an independent variable negatively impacts obtaining employment while an odds 
ratio grater than one indicates a positive impact on obtaining employment.  Table 8 summarizes 
the results of hypotheses testing. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 According to hypothesis 1, CEOs terminated for a character-damaging event will 
experience greater reputation damage and thus less likely to repair their reputations than CEOs 
terminated for other reasons. CEOs terminated for a character-damaging event have a 26 percent 
lower probability of obtaining employment compared to other terminations.  Despite the 
relationship being in the proposed direction the result here was not significant Hypothesis 2 
predicted that CEOs terminated for performance reasons would be less likely to repair their 
reputations than CEOs terminated for other reasons.  Surprisingly, such CEOs have a 47 percent 
greater probability of obtaining employment (p < 0.05) compared to other terminations.  Thus 
this hypothesis was not supported.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that CEOs with character 
terminations would be less likely to repair their reputations than those terminated for 
performance reasons.  This hypothesis was supported.  Character terminations had a negative 
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association with obtaining employment while performance termination had a positive association 
with the same. 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that reputation damage for minorities terminated from their 
positions will be greater and therefore less likely to repair their reputations than non-minority 
CEOs.  This hypothesis was partially supported with only one measure of minority status 
significant and in the hypothesized direction.  Surprisingly, females are approximately 2.5 times 
more likely than men to repair their reputations and obtain employment (p < 0.001), contrary to 
predictions.  In line with predictions however, national minorities are 37 percent less likely to 
obtain employment after termination than US-born CEOs (p < 0.05). 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that CEOs with greater physical attractiveness will repair their 
reputations faster.  This hypothesis was not supported.  In fact, less physical deviation from the 
ideal facial structure actually decreased the probability of employment by approximately 4 
percent.  Opinion of physical attractiveness, however, was positively associated with CEO 
reemployment with a 14 percent increase in probability.  None of these relationships were 
significant though. 
 According to hypothesis 6, CEOs with more power in the labor market will repair their 
reputations faster than those without such power.  Only two of the three measures of CEO power 
were significant, only providing partial support for this hypothesis.  CEO network size was 
associated with approximately one percent increase in the probability of obtaining employment 
(p < 0.001).  Yet CEOs with greater previous experience in the CEO position were 187 percent 
more likely to obtain employment during the sample period (p < 0.001), indicating that prior 
experience acts as a buffer to reputation-damaging event for CEOs.  Contrary to predictions, 
CEOs whose job prior to termination was also CEO were 42 percent less likely to obtain 
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employment compared to CEOs who did not hold another CEO job immediately preceding the 
job from which they were terminated (p <0.05).  
 Hypotheses 7 through 9 all predict relationships between media attention and reputation 
repair.   Hypothesis 7 predicts the amount of media attention paid to a CEO’s termination event 
will negatively impact reputation repair.  While greater media coverage of termination events 
negatively impact reputation repair, the results were not significant for hypothesis 7.  Hypothesis 
8, on the other hand, predicts that greater positive media attention will aid in reputation repair.  
Contrary to predictions more positive media attention was actually negatively associated with 
CEO reemployment.  Greater positivity reduced the probability of obtaining a job by 29 percent 
(p < .10).  Another surprising finding was with negative media attention surrounding a 
termination event.  Hypothesis 9 predicts that greater negative media attention hampers 
reputation repair.  Results indicate though that more negative press actually increases the 
probability of obtaining a new job, but this result was not significant.   
 Hypothesis 10 predicts that greater prevalence of CEO terminations will positively 
influence reputation repair.  While increased prevalence of CEO terminations positively 
impacted obtaining a new job as predicted, there was virtually no change in the probability of 
obtaining employment, less than 1 percent, and it was not significant.  This suggests that even if 
CEO terminations rise during a specific period, it does not decrease the novelty of the 
termination or provide any buffer against the reputation damage of employment termination. 
 Hypotheses 11 and 12 represent repudiation activities by CEOs in an effort to repair their 
reputations.  According to hypothesis 11 CEOs who engage in civic leadership by holding board 
positions at charities are more likely to repair their reputations.  For each additional board 
position held at a charitable organization the probability of obtaining employment increases by 
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61 percent, but even while the relationship was in the proposed direction the result was not 
significant and thus not supported.  Hypothesis 12, on the other hand, was supported.  This 
hypothesis predicted that paid employment at charitable organizations would positively influence 
reputation repair, and the results indicate that for every additional paid position at a charity the 
probability of obtaining a new job increased by 113 percent (p < 0.001).   
Model 2 
 The event of interest in model 2 was whether or not a terminated CEO obtained a job as 
CEO of another firm.  Thus, these executives experienced the least amount of reputation damage 
from their termination event.  The results for model 2 present some unique differences in regard 
to which factors are of greatest influence on reputation repair.  Hypotheses 1b and 2b predicts 
that terminations for character-damaging events and performance hinder reputation repair, 
respectively.  Similar to the results of model 1, CEOs with performance terminations were more 
likely to repair their reputations and obtain employment compared to executives with other 
terminations, though the probability of such is lower for model 2 with only a 19 percent greater 
probability compared to 47 percent probability in model 1.  Quite surprising though is the 
relationships between character termination and CEOs repairing their reputations by obtaining 
another CEO position.  Here character terminations are the most likely to result in reemployment 
as a CEO compared to all other causes for termination.  CEOs terminated for a character-
damaging event were 1.8 times more likely to obtain employment as a CEO compared to those 
terminated for other reasons (p < .10).  Thus, while these results present interesting evidence 
regarding reputation repair neither hypothesis here was supported. 
 Hypothesis 3b predicts that CEOs terminated for character-damaging events have greater 
difficulty repairing their reputations compared to those terminated for performance.  This 
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hypothesis was not supported as CEOs terminated for performance had 19 percent greater 
probability of obtaining a new CEO job, but those terminated for character-damaging events 
increased probability of obtaining such a job by 80 percent.  These results are different than 
those for model 1, suggesting that level of reputation repair is influenced by different factors.   
Hypothesis 4b predicts that minority CEOs are less likely to repair their reputations and 
obtain employment as CEO.  Female executives were more than 4 times more likely to obtain 
CEO positions after termination than male executives (p < 0.001).  Gender was the second 
largest factor in obtaining CEO employment in this model, but the relationship is not in the 
proposed direction.   National minorities are less likely to repair their reputations evidenced by a 
5 percent decrease in the probability of obtaining CEO employment after termination, but unlike 
model 1 the results are not significant for this model.  Comparing the two models, gender is 
substantially more important to a greater level of reputation repair as the likelihood of CEO 
employment increased more than 62 percent between the two models.  On the other hand, 
national minority status had a much smaller impact on greater levels of reputation repair with a 
decrease in the probability of employment of 37 percent in model 1 to only 5 percent in model 2.     
 Hypothesis 5b predicts that greater CEO attractiveness positively influences reputation 
repair.  Both measures of CEO attractiveness were in the proposed direction with attractiveness 
based on the scientific ideal of facial attractiveness increased the probability of employment as 
CEO by 16 percent and personal opinion of attractiveness increased probability by 14 percent.  
These results present one deviation from that of model 1 where both measures increase the 
likelihood of reemployment as a CEO compared to only personal opinion of attractiveness in 
model 1.  These hypotheses were not supported however as neither was significant. 
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 Hypothesis 6b predicted powerful CEOs in the labor market are more likely to repair 
their reputations.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  The first measure of power, number 
of prior CEO positions, was the largest influence on obtaining a new position as CEO.  For every 
additional prior CEO position the probability of obtaining a new CEO position increased almost 
500 percent (p < 0.001).  Network size was also significant and in the proposed direction, but the 
increase in probability of obtaining a new CEO position was less than 1 percent (p < 0.10).  
Holding a CEO position immediately prior to the position from which a CEO was terminated had 
a much larger influence in obtaining a new CEO position.  Contrary to prediction previous CEO 
status actually decreased the probability of obtaining a CEO position by 70 percent (p < 0.01), 
much larger than the 48 percent decrease in model 1.       
 Hypotheses 7b though 9b predict the media’s impact in reputation repair.  For hypothesis 
7b the amount of media coverage a termination event receives is predicted to negatively impact 
reputation repair.  This relationship is in the proposed direction with a 35 percent decrease in 
probability of obtaining a CEO job but not significant.  Greater media coverage appears to 
impact getting a CEO job more than obtaining any position as media coverage only decreases the 
probability of obtaining employment by 24 percent.  Hypothesis 8b predicts that greater positive 
media coverage aids CEOs in obtaining new CEO positions.  Contrary to predictions positive 
media attention decreases the probability of obtaining a CEO job by 3 percent though not 
significant.  Interestingly though positive media coverage appears to matter more for a greater 
level of reputation repair as the probability of obtaining any position was a decrease of 39 
percent compared to only 3 percent for a CEO position.  Hypothesis 9b suggests negative media 
attention hinders reputation repair and reemployment as a CEO.  Consistent with model 1 but 
contrary to predictions greater negative media attention actually increases the probability of 
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obtaining a CEO job by 36 percent though it is not significant.  Similar to positive media 
attention, it seems that negative media attention is more important for greater levels of reputation 
repair. 
Hypothesis 10b predicts that the prevalence of CEO termination positively influences 
reputation repair.  The results here are virtually the same as those for model 1 with 
approximately no change in the probability of CEO reemployment.  Therefore this hypothesis 
was not supported.  These results suggest that despite increasing commonality of termination in a 
specific period there is no real impact on reputation repair. 
Hypotheses 11b and 12b each suggest that CEOs who engage in activities to distance 
themselves from a reputation-damaging event and place themselves in a more positive light will 
be more likely to repair their reputations and obtain employment than those who do not engage 
in such activities.  Specifically hypothesis 11b predicts that CEOs who hold civic leadership 
positions are more likely to repair their reputations.  The results for this hypothesis mirror those 
in model 1.  CEOs who held board positions at charities were more likely to repair their 
reputations evidenced by a 63 percent increase in probability of obtaining a CEO position after 
termination, compared to a 61 percent increase in probability for obtaining any type of 
employment, though it was not significant.  For hypothesis 12b though CEOs who hold paid 
positions at charities are substantially more likely to obtain employment as a CEO.  For every 
additional paid charity position the probability of obtaining a CEO position increases by 242 
percent (p < 0.001), and this hypothesis is thus supported.  Compared to the 113 percent increase 
in probability of obtaining any employment in model 1, the evidence suggests paid charity work 
leads to substantially greater level of reputation repair. 
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Control variables     
 The control variables provide some interesting findings worthy of discussion.  First, 
while age does influence reputation repair and obtaining a new job, it only decreased the 
probability of getting a job during the sample period by 3 percent (p< 0.001).  Results are similar 
for obtaining another CEO job with the probability decreasing by 2 percent, but were not 
significant.  Second, CEOs holding more degrees and professional certifications are more likely 
to obtain employment but the increase in probability is only 1 percent in model 1 and not 
significant.  In terms of obtaining a new CEO job, however, the increase in probability is 34 
percent and significant (p <0.05).  This suggests educational and professional qualifications do 
more to repair reputation.  Finally, the most surprising results were from those who founded their 
own firms after termination.  In model 1 founding a firm was the most influential factor in 
obtaining new employment.  Those who founded a firm were 9.72 times more likely to obtain 
employment than those who did not (p < 0.001).  On the other hand, individuals who founded 
their own firms were less likely to obtain jobs as CEOs compared to those obtaining employment 
at established firms.  While the decrease in employment probability was only 6 percent, this is 
quite interesting because many founders were also CEOs of the firms they started.  Thus 
founding a firm does repair executives’ reputations, but it does not seem to be a path that offers 
substantial reputation repair.
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VI. DISCUSSION 
 This study aimed to make three contributions to the literature.  First, this study furthers 
the idea that reputations can and do change for executives and provides evidence that that 
reputation-damaging events do not impact all executives the same way.  Second, this study built 
upon prior reputation change research by concurrently examining four theoretical mechanisms 
underlying the changing nature of reputation.   Finally, specific factors within the 
aforementioned mechanisms were identified that influence reputation repair, and these factors 
each provided interesting insight into the change in executive reputation.  
One core finding concerns the differential impact of a single reputation-damaging event 
for CEOs and their reputations.  It was predicted that termination negatively impacted repairing 
one’s reputation and that the circumstances surrounding the termination (i.e. reason for 
termination) would have differential impacts on reputation change.  The evidence provided here 
suggests that even though termination is itself a reputation-damaging event, those experiencing 
termination for performance shortcomings were actually more likely to incrementally repair their 
reputations.  The initial conclusion is that this type of termination does not damage executive 
reputation as much as other types of terminations.  Prior findings suggest that performance in and 
of itself is not the primary mechanism by which reputation change is conferred (Love & Kraatz, 
2009).  At the same time, though, this result is surprising given the tendency to focus on 
executive performance and quality as the foundation for conferring reputation (e.g. Graffin, 
Pfarrer, & Hill, 2012; Wade, et al., 2006).  If an audience’s praise and admiration stem from a 
CEO’s performance then when that performance is called in to question and shown to be sub-par, 
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logic holds that reputational changes should follow.  This research thus provides a starting point 
to examining executive reputation as less a function of performance and more a function of 
characteristics and relational ties. 
When looking at substantial reputation repair, however, the results provide a different 
conclusion.  Those executives with character terminations were the most likely to repair their 
reputations and obtain new employment in the top job of firms.  This conclusion is consistent 
with prior research that board members with compromised backgrounds, such as those involved 
in fraud lawsuits, were more likely to obtain additional board seats given their experience 
handling negative situations, actually making them more valuable to firms (Helland, 2006).   
Here, terminated CEOs may possess additional expertise or at minimum experience dealing with 
negative social criticism and thus bring something to a firm that an individual without such 
experience cannot provide.  Therefore, this study emphasized and provided evidence that while 
executive reputations change, they also vary in level of change depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the event. 
Next, this study provides evidence that the underlying theoretical mechanisms 
influencing executive reputation change in terms of both reputation repair and level of reputation 
repair are executive characteristics and relational status, as both had the strongest influence on 
reputation repair.  National minorities were less likely to repair their reputations than US-born 
executives, but female CEOs were substantially more likely to repair their reputations than male 
CEOs.  This result is inconsistent with implicit leadership theories whereby the behavior of 
female managers is judged less favorably than that of male managers (Eagly & Karau, 2002).  If 
the actions of women in positions of leadership are judged more harshly, then their actions 
leading to their termination should be judged as with greater criticism, hindering reputation 
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repair.  However, as such the “think manger, think male” evidence provided during the 1990s 
and early 2000s (Ryan & Haslam, 2007) may underlie the novelty of female CEOs, thus 
providing them with greater visibility in the reputational dimension of being known.  Therefore, 
despite the presence of social prejudices concerning female executives and the lack of women 
holding top positions in organizations (e.g. Arfken, Bellar, & Helms, 2004; Maume, 2004), such 
sociostructural realities actually create greater awareness surrounding women in leadership.  It is 
theoretically plausible then that such enhanced awareness heightens “being known” for women 
more than it does for men and thus has a greater influence on reputation repair. 
Attractiveness, as an executive characteristic, also positively impacts reputation repair as 
predicted, but the results do not fully support the prediction.  The conclusion here is that while 
attractiveness positively biases the perceptions of others (Langlois, et al., 2000) it only 
marginally impacts the reputation dimensions.  Therefore, even though attractive individuals are 
less likely to receive punishment (Langlois, et al., 2009) or remedial action (Elovitz & Salvia, 
1982) in response to poor performance there is little reputational effect.   
The reputational status factors also provided interesting evidence regarding the change in 
executive reputation.  Most notably, the number of prior CEO position held had substantial 
influence on not only repairing reputation, but it also had the largest increase in probability of 
higher-level reputation repair.  Since relational status refers to relationships with individuals and 
organizations influencing reputation dynamics (Kraatz & Love, 2006), the more CEO jobs held 
means such a person has greater endorsement of their abilities and skills evidenced through their 
top job positions.  Also, given CEOs are typically seen as the “face of the firm” (e.g. Fanelli & 
Misangyi, 2006) their position is quite prominent.  Holding a greater number of CEO positions 
leads to increased prominence thereby being known for something prominent and important. 
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Unlike increasing past CEO experience, increasing network size had a small, positive 
impact on rebuilding reputation.  The access to resources through a larger network only 
minimally increased the probability of obtaining new employment or employment as a CEO, 
suggesting that being known in one’s network does not translate into being known more broadly.  
This may be because networks are not necessarily an endorsement of one’s skills, expertise, or 
quality.  Thus, though the results were statistically significant, network size does not 
substantially influence reputation repair. 
The most surprising result with the relational status factors was the previous position held 
by the CEO.  Following the same logic as that of multiple CEO positions, those with other CEO 
experience should be more visible given their position in the organization and signal greater 
prominence.  This was not the case here.  In fact, having a previous job that was also CEO 
produced the lowest probability of both repairing their reputations and repairing their reputations 
at a high level.  
Reputation change did not appear to be a function of technical efficacy as only one 
measure yielded any significant results.  The directionality of the relationships is of note, 
however.  More media attention paid to a termination event did decrease the likelihood of 
repairing one’s reputation as predicted, but the relationship between reputation repair and both 
positive and negative media attention were opposite that which was predicted.  Surprisingly, 
greater positive media attention negatively impacted reputation repair.  This result should be 
interpreted cautiously though because positive attention does not mean entirely positive media 
attention.  Rather the greater the positive tone of an article, the less likely an executive was to 
obtain new employment.   Since the average positive tone was 0.18 out of a possible 1.0, there 
was little positivity in most of the articles, and this may account for the observed result.  Another 
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explanation is that even if coverage about a termination event was written with a positive slant, it 
was still attention paid to the termination event nonetheless, and more attention paid to the event 
would negatively impact the reputation repair of the executive. 
The positive relationship between negative media attention and reputation repair was the 
most surprising result and deserves some greater consideration.  While negative media attention 
garners a stronger emotional and social response to executive termination, there are incentives 
for obfuscating negative information about a firm’s executive (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009).  
For example, directors releasing an executive from employment stand under the scrutiny of 
others for selecting such an individual in the first place, and attempts to minimize negative 
information stems from self-preservation.   
Second, the primary social arbiters in the case of an executive’s termination are other 
executives, directors, analysts, and the like.  Individuals’ careers influence their specific norms 
of interest (Chen & Meindl, 1991), and the interrelatedness of these groups’ professions creates 
similarity in their professional norms.  These groups also constitute a source of judgment and 
social punishment as well as an audience for judgment and punishment conferred by others, 
making them both sensegivers and sensemakers (Wiesenfeldt, et al, 2008).  The media serves as 
an intermediary between those with the power to distribute and enforce social punishments 
(sensegivers) and those calling for such punishment (sensemakers).  However, the continued 
negative attention paid to a terminated executive creates a form of celebritization, increasing this 
individual’s visibility and prominence in the media.  Increased visibility, even for negative 
reasons, leads to greater positive and negative reputational assessments (e.g. Gardberg & 
Fomburn, 2002).  Increased visibility thus also positively influences being known, one 
dimension of reputation (e.g. Lange, at al, 2011).  Even more, the reputational judgments of 
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similar professions tend to generalize across members (Highhouse, et al, 2009b).  Therefore, 
terminated executives garner negative media attention, but greater attention, even though 
negative attention, increases visibility and therefore lessens the impact of termination on 
reputation.  
The last technical efficacy factor was termination prevalence.  In line with predictions, 
the more executives terminated around the time of a focal termination, the more likely an 
executive was to repair their reputation.  Thus directionality was as hypothesized, but there was 
no real change in probability of obtaining employment.  This suggests that audiences conferring 
executive reputation are not comparing one’s executive’s event with that of others, so decreasing 
the novelty of a reputation-damaging event does not materially aid executives in repairing their 
reputations. 
 The strong associations between the control variables and reputation repair provided 
some unique insights.  Age, while negatively associated with reputation repair, had a much 
smaller impact on reputation repair than other factors.  It could be said that this is the result of 
older executives opting not to reenter the executive labor market due to retirement options, but 
the average age of terminated executives in the sample was less than 55 years old.  This is well 
below typical retirement age, suggesting that retirement, based on age, may not be the best 
explanation for this outcome.  In fact, age should signal experience and expertise in the labor 
market.  Instead, it is more probable that here age was a biasing factor in the hiring decision for 
older individuals. 
The norm conforming activities of interest, holding board positions at not-for-profit 
organizations or charities as well as employment at such, had positive impacts on CEO 
reputation repair.  These executives were rewarded for giving back to their communities by 
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getting back at least some of the reputation they lost through termination.  This provides 
evidence that repudiation techniques, specifically where individuals separate themselves from a 
negative action by participating in socially desirable actions, do provide a mechanism for 
repairing reputation.  Both board positions and paid positions go beyond just attending 
fundraisers or giving money or other donations to charities because they require a substantial 
amount of time and effort, so it is not known at this time if lesser repudiation activities would 
have the same effect.  The activities identified here are more visible in the labor market as well, 
possibly aiding their impact on reputation repair.      
The educational and professional certifications of executives also had an impact on their 
reputation repair.  The most notable thing here is that it only mattered significantly for those 
executives who managed to repair their reputations to pre-termination levels.  For the other 
executives the impact was only negligible.  These qualifications are a signal of performance and 
accomplishment and, as such, are technical efficacy mechanisms of reputation change. Even 
though other hypothesized factors did not provide significant results here, the qualifications 
results provide evidence that some technical efficacy factors are relevant to reputation repair 
research.  This factor is arguably closer to a direct performance linkage compared to the others 
tested, indicating that the performance signals of the media and other environmental factors do 
not ring as loudly as those signals with closer ties to actual performance. 
The founding of firms by terminated executives, the final control variable of interest, 
presented two unique pieces of evidence.  First, founding a firm had the largest influence on 
reputation repair, with a near ten-fold increase in the likelihood of obtaining a job.  Many 
terminated executives in the sample made the decision to work for themselves instead of another 
firm.  Further examination of the data for this study indicates that multiple founding executives 
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started their own firm shortly after termination and either closed their doors or separated 
themselves from it as soon as a different position was obtained.  Others were repeat founders, 
and after being terminated by the board of their own firms, simply started another one, 
continuing this cycle multiple times throughout their careers.  This lends evidence that reputation 
plays a role in new venture creation.  One reason for this may be that these executives possess 
greater resources or knowledge that afford them the opportunity to start their own firm.  The 
most interesting piece though is the abandonment or separation from the new firm as soon as a 
new job is accepted.  This begs the question whether the new venture was strictly for the purpose 
of getting back what an executive lost in the labor market.  It would be interesting to examine 
both why and how these patterns emerge as well as how reputation influences firm founders.      
Limitations.  Even with support for multiple hypotheses this study is not without 
limitations.  First, it was not possible to observe CEOs’ motives for reemployment following a 
termination.  Some CEOs may make a conscious decision not to re-enter the workforce in order 
to focus on family obligations, to pursue other interests, or to remain as a director or join other 
boards as a director.  For such CEOs there is very limited information on what prompts former 
CEOs to continue seeking employment and thus repair their reputations.  It was attempted 
though to capture one visible CEO motive, whether former CEOs decided to start their own firms 
as opposed to obtaining employment at other established organizations.  This was found to be a 
significant indicator in repairing one’s reputation.  Future research should examine the role 
motives for repairing one’s reputation influence actual reputation repair.  The consequences of 
reputation change may not be uniform among executives, and this could differentially impact the 
motives to repair one’s reputation.  
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 Second, it was also not possible to observe what actions CEOs are taking to get other 
employment.  Job seekers vary in their urgency to obtain new employment, and passive job 
seekers typically experience the least amount of urgency in the job search process while active 
job seekers tend to experience greater urgency and set deadlines for themselves in finding 
employment (Lopez-Kidwell, Grosser, Dineen, & Borgatti, 2013).  Therefore CEOs who are 
passively seeking new employment may not obtain a new job given their lack of urgency and 
deadlines to do so.  Perceived opportunities also influence the level job seeker effort and 
subsequent behavior (Dineen, Duffy, Henle, & Lee, 2015).  CEOs then who perceive fewer 
opportunities available to them will alter their search efforts accordingly.  Thus it may be that 
CEOs who expend greater effort during their job search process are able to obtain employment at 
a different rate than those who did not engage in such effort.  It is important for future research to 
examine not just the motives for repairing reputation but the specific activities in which a person 
engages aimed at repairing reputation.   
 Third, the measure used here for reputation repair presents another limitation because 
proxies or measures for reputation repair are difficult to ascertain.  While measures of positive 
reputation are directly visible in modern organizations (e.g. winning awards, media coverage, 
etc.), measures of the point at which one’s reputation begins to repair is much more difficult to 
pinpoint.  The use of current measures in reputation research would only capture those 
individuals whose reputations are considered to be higher than others (e.g. celebrities).  In the 
case of reputation repair, however, relying on reputation’s definition (Lange, et al., 2011), an 
individual must be viewed as being known, being known for something, and generalized 
favorably.  The measure used here indicates, at least in the executive labor market, that the focal 
executive has overcome at minimum some of the negative influence brought about by 
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termination by obtaining employment.  This new employment represents the new level of 
reputation that an executive possesses in the labor market.  At the same time, an executive who 
obtains new employment is viewed at least favorably by the employing firm and is known for his 
or her position.  It is acknowledged that the operationalization of reputation repair used here may 
limit the generalizability of the results.  However, this measure allowed for the simultaneous 
testing of multiple theoretical lenses in reputation repair that provided unique insight and 
evidence into which mechanisms most influence reputation change.    
 Finally, employing the use of media articles about terminated executives presents some 
substantial challenges.  First, obtaining access to multiple article sources proved to be quite 
difficult.  Many databases do not allow for the simultaneous downloading of articles related to 
specific search criteria.  This lead to individual manual searches that cannot unearth all possible 
articles related to a particular CEO.  Second, very few articles were written solely about a focal 
executive and their termination.  Instead, many articles’ subjects were newly appointed CEOs 
and only mention that this person is replacing the terminated executive.  In the event of character 
terminations, however, more articles were written about the terminations and how such 
terminations impact society as opposed to a specific CEO and the termination.  Third, with the 
limited amount of articles found for the executives in this study the results should be interpreted 
with care. 
Future research.  This study remains the first to study the change in reputation of 
executives terminated from employment, but future research should examine other reputation-
damaging events.  The current literature is laden with that which builds reputation but still far 
less is known about what influences reputation decline.  What types of events actually impact 
reputation decline?  Association with environmental issues, fraud events, lawsuits by employees, 
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or social media attacks offer examples that may influence the decline of one’s reputation.  
Alternatively, what role does reputation itself have in reputation damage?  Reputation acts as a 
buffer in the event of negative information (e.g. Dowling, 2002; Pfarrer, et al., 2010), but little is 
known about how much reputation one needs in order to buffer negative information and 
subsequently decrease reputation.  A small number of reputation studies even point to 
reputation’s relationship with negative behaviors, such as financial statement fraud (Beasley, 
1996).  This then begs the question of whether or not reputation itself may also provide a “get 
out of jail free” card to those conferred high levels of reputation wherein the engagement of 
certain reputation-damaging events might increase. 
 Another area of potential future research concerns reputation repair mechanisms.  This 
study highlights the impact of executive characteristics on reputation repair, the influence of 
external factors outside executives’ control, and the actions taken to distance themselves from a 
reputation-damaging event.  Which factors then are of greater influence to those attempting to 
repair their reputations?  Another way to phrase that would be to investigate if there are actual 
steps individuals can take to repair their reputations or if it is largely outside of their control.  
The reputation literature has long held that media plays a large role in influencing reputation 
(e.g. Bednar, Love, & Kraatz, 2015; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Treadway, et al., 2009).  
However, the influence of media on repairing a damaged reputation has received very little 
attention. 
 In conclusion, reputations can and do change over time in response to reputation-building 
or reputation-damaging events.  This study provides both an important step forward to 
understanding the mechanisms that alter reputation and the factors of greatest influence on 
reputation change.   This area of the literature has only started to emerge and provides a new and 
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exciting avenue to continue exploring the causes and consequences of social approval assets.  
Without more work on the changing nature of reputation we will only be able to have a narrowed 
view of the construct itself and be limited in our understanding of it.  The literature has clearly 
suggested that reputation matters (e.g. Lange, et al., 2011), so additional inquiry will provide 
greater insight in to how the actions and decisions of managers influence their reputations. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Reputation Functions and Theoretical Foundations 
Reputation function of Theoretical foundation 
Executive traits Status characteristics 
Networks and relationships Social comparison and status diffusion 
Performance information Signaling 
Social norms and expectations Norm conformity 
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Table 2 
 
Model 1 – Reemployment 
Variables   Measure 
Dependent variable 
Reputation repair Obtained employment (0,1) 
Independent variables - Employment characteristics 
Character termination Legal or ethical reason for termination 
Capability termination  Performance-based termination 
Number of CEO positions Count of CEO positions prior to focal position 
Previous position CEO Position prior to focal position was CEO (0,1) 
Network size Number of connections as defined in BoardEx 
Independent variables - CEO characteristics 
Attractiveness (1) Degree of facial characteristics match (1-5) 
Attractiveness (2) Respondent opinion of facial attractiveness (1-5) 
Gender Female, male (0,1) 
National minority Birthplace outside of US (0,1) 
Independent variables - Environmental factors 
Positive media attention Text analysis score 
Negative media attention Text analysis score 
Termination prevalence Number of CEOs terminated during a period 
Independent variables - Repudiation activities 
Civic leadership Number of board positions held at charities 
Civic employment Number of paid positions at charities 
Control variables 
CEO age Age in years 
Qualifications Number of degrees and professional certifications 
  Founder   Started own firm (0,1) 
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Table 3 
 
Model 2 – Reemployment as CEO 
Variables   Measure 
Dependent variable 
Reputation repair Obtained employment as CEO (0,1) 
Independent variables - Employment characteristics 
Character termination Legal or ethical reason for termination 
Capability termination  Performance-based termination 
Number of CEO positions Count of CEO positions prior to focal position 
Previous position CEO Position prior to focal position was CEO (0,1) 
Network size Number of connections as defined in BoardEx 
Independent variables - CEO characteristics 
Attractiveness (1) Degree of facial characteristics match (1-5) 
Attractiveness (2) Respondent opinion of facial attractiveness (1-5) 
Gender Female, male (0,1) 
National minority Birthplace outside of US (0,1) 
Independent variables - Environmental factors 
Positive media attention Text analysis score 
Negative media attention Text analysis score 
Termination prevalence Number of CEOs terminated during a period 
Independent variables - Repudiation activities 
Civic leadership Number of board positions held at charities 
Civic employment Number of paid positions at charities 
Control variables 
CEO age Age in years 
Qualifications Number of degrees and professional certifications 
  Founder   Started own firm (0,1) 
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Table 4 
 
Attractiveness reference studies 
Authors Year Raters Number of raters Media  Scale 
Commissio & 
Finkelstein 
2012 
Undergraduate 
students 
Unknown Photographs 7-point 
Frieze et al 1991 Adults 2 men/2 women Photographs 5-point 
Judge et al 2009 
Undergraduate 
students & adults 
6 Photographs 7-point 
Scott & Judge 2013 Unknown 4 Photographs Unknown 
Solnick & 
Schweitzer 
1999 Adults 4 Photographs 5-point 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MODELS 1 AND 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105
Table 5: Model 1 – Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
Variable Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Obtained Job 0.64 0.48 1.00
2 Character 0.09 0.28 -0.04 1.00
3 Performance 0.33 0.47 0.14 -0.22 1.00
4 Number CEO jobs 1.67 0.89 0.29 -0.08 0.19 1.00
5 Network Size 714.3 534.9 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.04 1.00
6 Previous CEO 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.60 0.02 1.00
7 Mask 2.59 0.67 0.00 -0.04 0.22 0.03 -0.02 0.09 1.00
8 Attractiveness 2.52 0.67 0.07 -0.09 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.64 1.00
9 Gender 0.14 0.35 0.15 -0.06 0.11 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.07 0.22 1.00
10 Nationality 0.19 0.40 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.09 0.03 1.00
11 Civic Lead 0.03 0.22 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.06 1.00
12 Civic Employ 0.06 0.35 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.31 -0.05 0.35 0.15 0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 1.00
13 Prevalence 21.7 9.84 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 1.00
14 Qualifications 1.72 1.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.18 0.17 -0.14 0.23 0.21 0.09 -0.02 0.20 -0.20 0.12 1.00
15 Founder 0.11 0.31 0.22 -0.04 0.11 0.29 -0.02 0.22 -0.05 0.00 0.16 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.17 -0.03 1.00
16 Age 53.3 8.60 -0.31 0.15 -0.02 -0.16 -0.23 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.17 0.03 0.27 0.17 -0.04 1.00
17 Media Amount 0.15 0.41 -0.20 0.16 -0.09 -0.12 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 1.00
18 Positive Media 0.18 0.61 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.17 -0.11 0.03 -0.14 0.52 1.00
19 Negative Media 0.04 0.22 -0.22 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.20 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.57 0.60  
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Table 6: Model 2 – Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
Variable Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Obtained CEO job 0.21 0.41 1.00
2 Character 0.09 0.28 0.05 1.00
3 Performance 0.33 0.47 0.19 -0.22 1.00
4 Number CEO jobs 1.67 0.89 0.58 -0.08 0.19 1.00
5 Network Size 714.3 534.9 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.04 1.00
6 Previous CEO 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.60 0.02 1.00
7 Mask 2.59 0.67 0.06 -0.04 0.22 0.03 -0.02 0.09 1.00
8 Attractiveness 2.52 0.67 0.07 -0.09 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.64 1.00
9 Gender 0.14 0.35 0.19 -0.06 0.11 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.07 0.22 1.00
10 Nationality 0.19 0.40 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.09 0.03 1.00
11 Civic Lead 0.03 0.22 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.06 1.00
12 Civic Employ 0.06 0.35 0.26 0.07 0.18 0.31 -0.05 0.35 0.15 0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 1.00
13 Prevalence 21.7 9.84 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 1.00
14 Qualifications 1.72 1.01 -0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.18 0.17 -0.14 0.23 0.21 0.09 -0.02 0.20 -0.20 0.12 1.00
15 Founder 0.11 0.31 0.12 -0.04 0.11 0.29 -0.02 0.22 -0.05 0.00 0.16 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.17 -0.03 1.00
16 Age 53.3 8.60 -0.09 0.15 -0.02 -0.16 -0.23 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.17 0.03 0.27 0.17 -0.04 1.00
17 Media Amount 0.15 0.41 -0.12 0.16 -0.09 -0.12 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 1.00
18 Positive Media 0.18 0.61 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.17 -0.11 0.03 -0.14 0.52 1.00
19 Negative Media 0.04 0.22 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.20 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.57 0.60
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Table 7 
 
Results of Survival Time Regression Analysis for Obtaining Employment 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variables 
Odds 
Ratio   s.e.   
Odds 
Ratio   s.e. 
Character termination 0.74 0.18 1.80 + 0.63 
Performance termination 1.47 ** 0.17 1.19 0.26 
Age 0.97 *** 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Gender 2.49 *** 0.54 4.03 *** 1.26 
Nationality 0.63 * 0.14 0.95 0.33 
Attractiveness mask 0.96 0.11 1.16 0.20 
Attractiveness opinion 1.14 0.13 1.14 0.20 
Number of CEO jobs 2.87 *** 0.28 5.98 *** 1.06 
Network size 1.00 *** 0.00 1.00 + 0.00 
Previous job CEO 0.58 * 0.16 0.30 ** 0.12 
Qualifications 1.01 0.08 1.34 * 0.18 
Civic employment 2.13 *** 0.45 3.42 *** 0.89 
Civic leadership 1.61 0.61 1.63 0.87 
Termination prevalence 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Founded firm 9.72 *** 2.05 0.94 0.41 
Media amount 0.76 0.15 0.65 0.23 
Positive media 0.71 + 0.13 0.97 0.22 
Negative media 1.05   0.34   1.36   0.57 
n = 467.  Odds ratios larger than 1 represent positive associations, and odds ratios less than 1 
represent negative associations. 
    + p < .10 
    * p < .05 
  ** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 8 
 
Variables Supported Directionality Significant Supported Directionality Significant
H1 - Character termination No Yes No No No Yes
H2 - Performance termination No No Yes No No No
H3 - Character vs. performance Yes Yes Yes No No No
H4 - Minority (Gender) No No Yes No No Yes
H4 - Minority (Nationality) Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
H5 - Attractiveness No Yes No No Yes No
H6 - Power (Number CEO jobs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
H6 - Power (Network size) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
H6 - Power (Previous job CEO) No No Yes No No Yes
H7 - Positive media No No Yes No No No
H8 - Negative media No No No No No No
H9 - Termination prevalence No Yes No Yes Yes No
H10 - Civic leadership No Yes No No Yes No
H11 - Civic employment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model 1 Model 2
Summary of Hypotheses Testing
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Southern Management Association Annual Meeting, Charlotte, NC. October 25-29, 2016. 
 
Marshall. D. R., Palar, J. M., Dibrell, C., Gentry, R. G.  2016. New director selection in family 
firms under identity challenging contingencies. Paper presentation at the Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA. August 9, 2016. 
 
Dibrell, C., Gentry, R. G, Marshall. D. R., Palar, J. M., & Davis, W.  2016. New director 
selection in family-influenced, lone-founder, and regular publicly traded firms: Social 
identity and selection. Paper presentation at the European Academy of Management 
Annual Meeting, Paris, France. June 3, 2016. 
 
Palar, J. M., Knippen, J. M., & Gentry, R. G. 2015. Discretion to color outside the leadership 
lines: An examination of women CEO appointments. Paper presentation at the Southern 
Management Association Annual Meeting, St. Pete Beach, FL. October 30, 2015. 
 
Dibrell, C., Gentry, R. G, Marshall. D. R., & Palar, J. M.  2015. New director selection in family-
influenced, lone-founder, and regular publicly traded firms: Social identity and selection. 
Paper presentation at the Theories of Family Enterprise Conference. Texas Christian 
University, Forth Worth, TX. May 28, 2015. 
 
Knippen, J. M, Palar, J. M., & Gentry, R. G. 2014. Breaking the mold: An examination of board 
discretion in women CEO appointments. Paper presentation at the Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting. Philadelphia, PA. August 5, 2014. 
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Clayton, R. W., Stark, G., Novicevic, M., Roberts, F. B., & Palar, J. M. 2014. Auto-tuned voices: 
Why do we distort the pig iron tales?. Paper presentation at the OBTC Teachers 
Conference for Management Educators. Nashville, TN. June 13, 2014. 
 
Palar, J. M., Fairclough, S., & Dibrell, C. 2014. Employer branding in family firms: An 
investigation. Paper presentation at the Family Enterprise Research Conference. 
Portland, OR. June 7, 2014. 
 
Palar, J. M., Novicevic, M., Humphreys, J. H., & Buckley, M. R. 2013. Positive Leadership in 
the Extreme Contexts of the Emancipation Era. Paper presentation at the Southern 
Management Association Annual Meeting. New Orleans, LA. November 8, 2013. 
 
Palar, J. M., Gentry, R. J., & Knippen, J. M. 2013. Sensemaking and Female CEO Ascension: 
The Role of Strategic Noise. Paper presentation at the Strategic Management Society 
Annual Meeting. Atlanta, GA. October 1, 2013. 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE        
Principles of Management   (MGMT 371) 
Human Resource Management (MGMT 383)  
Family Business Management (MGMT 486)  
Organizational Behavior   (MGMT 391) 
Management of Strategic Planning  (MGMT 493) 
Compensation Management  (MGMT 494) 
 
Median evaluation score across all courses: 5.00/5.00 
Average evaluation score across all courses:  4.38/5.00 
 
OTHER RECENT EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE 
Regional Human Resources Manager  
VCNA – Prairie Material  
 
Director of Human Resources and Information Technology  
The Arc of the Quad Cities Area 
 
PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS  
Senior Professional in Human Resources, SPHR (2009) 
   Human Resource Certification Institute, Alexandria, VA  
 
SHRM – Senior Certified Professional, SHRM-SCP (2015) 
   Society for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, VA 
 
Member 
Academy of Management 
Society for Human Resource Management  
Southern Management Association  
Strategic Management Society 
